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Abstract
This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online
algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an online
algorithm to an offline benchmark in worst-case over inputs, and prior-independent mechanism
design compares the expected performance of a mechanism on an unknown distribution (of
inputs, i.e., agent values) to the optimal mechanism for the distribution in worst case over
distributions. For competitive analysis, a critical concern is the choice of benchmark. This paper
gives a method for selecting a good benchmark. We show that optimal algorithm/mechanism
for the optimal benchmark is equal to the prior-independent optimal algorithm/mechanism.
We solve a central open question in prior-independent mechanism design, namely we identify
the prior-independent revenue-optimal mechanism for selling a single item to two agents with
i.i.d. and regularly distributed values. We use this solution to solve the corresponding benchmark
design problem. Via this solution and the above equivalence of prior-independent mechanism
design and competitive analysis (a.k.a. prior-free mechanism design) we show that the standard
method for lower bounds of prior-free mechanisms is not generally tight for the benchmark
design program.
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1 Introduction
There are two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of mechanism design
and online algorithms (see detailed historical discussion in Section 6). A key property of these
environments is that with the given constraints (incentive compatibility or online arrivals) the
best outcome is unachievable pointwise. The first approach considers a benchmark and looks
for a mechanism (resp. algorithm) that pointwise approximates the benchmark, a.k.a., prior-free
approximation (resp. competitive analysis). The choice of benchmark is an important variable
of this approach. The second approach assumes that the input is drawn at random from an
unknown distribution in a family and looks for a mechanism that approximates, in worst-case over
distributions in the family, the performance of the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the distribution,
a.k.a., prior-independent approximation. (Respectively, this approach could also be applied to
online algorithms.) This paper formalizes the problem of designing a good benchmark for prior-
free approximation (resp. competitive analysis) and connects this benchmark design problem to
prior-independent optimization.
Terminology and concrete examples from mechanism design are henceforth adopted for the
majority of the paper. However, the main result relating benchmark design to prior-independent
optimization does not rely on any specifics from mechanism design. Instead it applies to families
of mechanisms represented by a family of functions from inputs to performances. In Section 5 we
instantiate the framework for online learning and give results that parallel the specific developments
for mechanism design.
The choice of benchmark in the first approach impacts the ability of approximation with respect
to the benchmark to distinguish between good and bad mechanisms. On one hand a benchmark
should be an upper bound on what is achievable by a mechanism; otherwise, approximating it does
not necessarily mean that a mechanism is good. On the other hand it should not be too loose an
upper bound; otherwise, neither good nor bad mechanisms can obtain good approximations and
the degree to which we can distinguish good and bad mechanisms via the benchmark is limited.
As illustration, consider comparing the revenue of mechanisms for selling a digital good to n
agents with values v = (v1, . . . , vn) bounded on [1,H] to one of two benchmarks, the sum-of-values
benchmark
∑
i vi and the price-posting-revenue benchmark maxi i v(i) where v(i) is the ith highest
value. To ensure benchmarks give an upper bound on revenue, Hartline and Roughgarden (2008)
suggested that the benchmark satisfies the property that, for any distribution on inputs from a
given family of distributions, the expected benchmark (over the same distribution of inputs) be
at least the expected performance of the optimal mechanism that knows the distribution. Thus
approximation of the benchmark implies approximation of the optimal mechanism for any of the
distributions in the family. We refer to this constraint as normalization. Both the sum-of-values
and price-posting-revenue benchmarks are normalized (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2008).
Not all normalized benchmarks are equally good at discriminating between good and bad mech-
anisms. Consider the following two mechanisms. The random-sampling mechanism partitions the
agents at random and offers the optimal price from each part to the other part (Goldberg et al.,
2006). The random-power-pricing mechanism posts a take-it-or-leave-it price drawn from the uni-
form distribution on powers of two in [1,H] (Goldberg and Hartline, 2003). These mechanisms and
the benchmarks of the preceding paragraph are related as follows. On all inputs v, the sum-of-values
benchmark exceeds the random-power-pricing mechanism by a Θ(logH) factor. On all inputs v,
the random sampling mechanism and the price-posting-revenue benchmark are Θ(1). Moreover,
the performance of the latter benchmark and mechanism are always sandwiched between the former
1
benchmark and mechanism and can equal either of them up to Θ(1). From this analysis, we see
that the loose benchmark of sum-of-values does not discriminate between good mechanisms like
random-sampling and bad mechanisms like random-power-pricing.
The preceding discussion suggests a benchmark design problem of identifying the normalized
benchmark to which the tightest approximation is possible. We refer to the tightest approximation
possible for a benchmark as its resolution (see Definition 3), as up to this factor the benchmark can-
not distinguish between good and bad mechanisms. The sum-of-values benchmark has logarithmic
resolution while the price-posting-revenue benchmark has constant resolution.
In summary: A family of distributions over inputs induces a class of normalized benchmarks.
The benchmark admitting the tightest approximation, i.e. having smallest resolution, is optimal.
The mechanism achieving this approximation is the prior-free optimal mechanism for the bench-
mark. Normalization of the benchmark implies that the prior-free approximation factor of a mecha-
nism (to the benchmark) is at least its prior-independent approximation factor (for the normalizing
family of distributions). A natural question is how this prior-free approach, and its optimal mecha-
nism, compares to directly identifying the prior-independent optimal mechanism, i.e., the one with
the best worst-case over distributions approximation to the Bayesian optimal mechanism.
The first main result of the paper is the general result that optimal benchmark design is equiva-
lent to prior-independent optimization (Section 2). Described in the context of mechanism design,
this result shows that the prior-free optimal mechanism for the optimal benchmark is the prior-
independent optimal mechanism and that the optimal benchmark is simply the prior-independent
optimal mechanism scaled up by its approximation factor (so as to satisfy the normalization con-
straint).1 Consequently, it is not possible to identify optimal benchmarks and their corresponding
optimal mechanisms for problems in which we are unable to solve the prior-independent optimiza-
tion problem.
Our second main result is to solve the benchmark optimization problem (equivalently: solve
the prior-independent mechanism design problem) for the problem of maximizing revenue from the
sale of a single item to two agents for the family of i.i.d. regular value distributions (Section 3).
This result answers a major question left open from Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015), Fu et al. (2015),
and Allouah and Besbes (2018). The optimal mechanism is a mixture between the second-price
auction, where each agent is offered a price equal to the highest of the other agents’ values, and the
auction where these prices are scaled up by a factor of about 2.5. Our solution to this central open
question is the first example of a prior-independent optimal mechanism that arises as the solution
to a non-trivial optimization problem and is not a standard mechanism from the literature (though
the mechanism does fall into the lookahead family of mechanisms described by Ronen (2001) and
has the same form as mechanisms used to prove bounds in Fu et al. (2015) and Allouah and Besbes
(2018)). Our construction pins down the worst-case family of distributions. To solve the equivalent
of benchmark design and prior-independent optimization, the approach of this paper is to directly
solve the prior-independent optimization problem and use that solution to solve the benchmark
design problem.
A key component of optimal benchmark design is tight lower bounds on the prior-free approx-
imation of a benchmark. There is a standard method for lower bounding the approximation ratio
1The analysis that proves this equivalence is straightforward and, perhaps, obvious in hindsight. As we will
describe below, there is an alternative benchmark design program which we view, in hindsight, as a relaxation of our
benchmark design program. The prior literature strongly suggested that this alternative program and our program
are equivalent; our third result shows that in fact the relaxation is lossy.
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of the best mechanism for a given benchmark (Goldberg et al., 2006). Consider the distribution
over inputs for which all mechanisms achieve the same performance, e.g., for revenue maximiza-
tion in mechanism design this distribution is the so-called equal-revenue distribution. The ratio
of the expected value of the benchmark on this distribution to the revenue of any mechanism (all
“undominated” mechanisms are the same) gives a lower bound on the approximation factor of any
mechanism to the benchmark. Hartline and McGrew (2005) proved that this approach is tight for
a large family of benchmarks and n = 3 agents. Chen et al. (2014) proved that this approach is
tight for a large family of benchmarks and a general number n of agents. Thus, a natural approach
to solve the benchmark optimization problem is to relax the program to optimize, not the approx-
imation factor of the best mechanism, but the lower bound on the best approximation factor from
the above approach. Our third main result – without being able to explicitly solve this relaxed
program – is that the relaxation is not without loss, i.e., it gives a normalized benchmark for which
the lower bound is not achievable by any mechanism (Section 4).
Our proof of the third main result follows from the second main result and a counter example
that shows that there is a benchmark that achieves a lower objective value (for the relaxed bench-
mark program) than the approximation ratio of the optimal prior-independent auction (which our
first result shows to be the optimal objective value of the original benchmark program).
Our second and third results are proved under the restriction of mechanisms that are (a)
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), i.e., where truthtelling is a good strategy for
each agent regardless of the strategies of other agents, and (b) scale invariant. It is known that
there are environments for prior-independent mechanism design where DSIC is not without loss
(Feng and Hartline, 2018). The restricted family of DSIC mechanisms is interesting even if it is
with loss; however, far more study of non-incentive-compatible mechanisms is warranted. It is not
known whether scale invariance is without loss or not, though Allouah and Besbes (2018) conjecture
that it is without loss. This question is important and remains open.
There is an important negative interpretation of our first result, that the prior-free benchmark
optimization problem and the prior-independent optimization problem give the same answer (which
has consequences for both mechanism design and online algorithms). One reason to prefer prior-
free analysis over prior-independent analysis is that it could be more robust. Of course to be more
robust, as Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) have recommended, we need to choose a normalized
benchmark, i.e., one for which prior-free approximation implies prior-independent approximation.
With many possible normalized benchmarks, we need a method for selecting one. We have adopted
a natural formal method for selecting one, namely, the one that admits the tightest approximation
is the best one. However, the results of the paper show that the answer we will then get from
studying prior-free approximation of this optimal benchmark is the same as the answer we will get
from the original prior-independent question. Thus, there is no added robustness from the prior-free
approximation of the optimal benchmark (over prior-independent analysis). Of course, there are
environments where increased robustness can informally be observed from prior-free approximation
of ad hoc, i.e., non-optimal, benchmarks. This observations suggests the main open question of this
paper which is to identify a rigorous framework for evaluating prior-free benchmarks which leads to
an additional desired robustness over the prior-independent framework. We will formally describe
this shortcoming of the framework with the example environment of no-regret online learning in
Section 5.
3
2 Benchmark Optimization Is Prior-independent Optimization
We formulate the benchmark optimization problem in abstract terms and prove that it is equiva-
lent to prior-independent optimization. Our framework and results in this section hold generally
for algorithm design, however, we will adopt notation and terminology for mechanism design to
maintain consistency with the discussion in subsequent sections. Notably, the development of this
section makes no assumptions on the families of distributions over the input that are considered.
Denote the space of inputs by V and an input in this space by v. Denote a family of distributions
over input space by F ⊂ ∆(V) and a distribution in the family by F . Denote a family of feasible
mechanisms by M and a mechanism in this family by M . Denote a family of benchmarks by
B and a benchmark in this family by B. For our purposes we will view both a mechanism and
a benchmark as a function that maps the input space to an expected performance (e.g., in the
case the mechanism is randomized), denoted respectively by M(v) and B(v). When evaluating
the performance of a mechanism or benchmark in expectation over the distribution we adopt the
short-hand notation M(F ) = Ev∼F [M(v)] and B(F ) = Ev∼F [B(v)].
In these abstract terms we formally define the Bayesian, prior-independent, and prior-free op-
timization problems.
Definition 1. The Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem is given by a distribution F and
family of mechanisms M and asks for the mechanism OPTF with the maximum expected perfor-
mance:
OPTF = argmax
M∈M
M(F ). (OPTF )
Definition 2. The prior-independent mechanism design problem is given by a family of mechanisms
M and a family of distributions F and solves the program
β = min
M∈M
max
F∈F
OPTF (F )
M(F )
. (β)
Next, ρB is the approximation ratio of the optimal prior-free mechanism for benchmark B; in the
subsequent discussion of benchmark design, we reinterpret ρB as the resolution of benchmark B.
Definition 3. The prior-free mechanism design problem is given by a family of mechanisms M
and a benchmark B and solves the program
ρB = min
M∈M
max
v∈V
B(v)
M(v)
. (ρB)
Recall from the introduction, benchmarks with small resolution are better at differentiating good
mechanisms from bad one. Both prior-independent and prior-free mechanism design problems are
searching for mechanisms with robust performance guarantees. In principle, prior-free guarantees
can provide more robustness than prior-independent guarantees as the guarantee is required to
hold pointwise on all inputs rather than in expectation according to the distribution. Whether or
not a prior-free guarantee is meaningful depends on the choice of benchmark. The possibility that
some benchmarks might be better than others for meaningfully quantifying the performance of a
mechanism suggests that benchmarks themselves can be optimized.
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Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) recommend restricting attention to benchmarks that satisfy
the following normalization property which requires that the benchmark is an upper bound on the
optimal performance of a mechanism. Rather than measure this optimal performance pointwise as
is common with online algorithms, Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) recommend measuring this
optimal performance in expectation with respect to any distribution in a family of distributions.
This way of measuring the optimal performance can take into account the constraints on the
mechanism, i.e., that M ∈ M.2 The normalization constraint implies a strong guarantee: A
mechanism that is a ρ approximation to a normalized benchmark guarantees a ρ prior-independent
approximation.
Definition 4. A benchmark B is normalized for a family of distributions F and family of mecha-
nisms if for every distribution in the family the expected benchmark is at least the optimal expected
performance, i.e.,
B(F ) ≥ OPTF (F ), ∀F ∈ F .
Denote the normalized benchmarks for F by B(F).
Proposition 1 (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2008). If mechanism M is a prior-free ρ approxima-
tion of a benchmark B normalized to distributions F then its prior-independent approximation for
distributions F is at most ρ.
The point of mechanism design is a principled method for choosing one mechanism over another.
The prior-free framework described above gives such a method only in so far as approximation of
the benchmark distinguished between good mechanisms and bad ones. For example, no mecha-
nism will approximate a prior-free benchmark that is too large, thus, good mechanisms will not
necessarily be separated from bad ones. Recall the discussion of the sum-of-values and posted-
price-revenue benchmarks in the introduction. One way to quantify the inability of a benchmark to
discriminate is by considering the approximation factor of the best mechanisms for the benchmark,
i.e., the benchmark’s resolution (Definition 3). Our benchmark design program aims to identify
the benchmark with the finest resolution.
Definition 5. The benchmark design problem for family of distributions F , family of mechanisms
M, and space of inputs V solves the program
γ = min
B∈B(F)
ρB = min
B∈B(F)
min
M∈M
max
v∈V
B(v)
M(v)
. (γ)
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section, that the benchmark design
problem and the prior-independent mechanism design problem are equivalent. Before doing so it
should be noted that it is not generally understood how to solve these problems. (We will, however,
give a solution to a paradigmatic prior-independent mechanism design problem in the next section.)
Theorem 1. For any family of distributions F , any set of mechanisms M, benchmark design is
equivalent to prior-independent mechanism design, i.e., γ = β, and the optimal benchmark is given
by the performance of the prior-independent optimal mechanism scaled up by its approximation
ratio β.
2For mechanism design, these constraints will be incentive compatibility and individual rationality. For online
algorithms these constraints are that the current decision must be made before the future input is known.
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This theorem follows from a corollary of Proposition 1 which shows that β ≤ γ and the following
lemma which shows that γ ≤ β.
Corollary 1. For any families of distributions and mechanisms, the prior-independent optimal
ratio β is at most the optimal benchmark ratio γ, i.e., β ≤ γ.
Proof. By the definition of program (γ), the optimal mechanism for the optimal benchmark is a
prior-free γ approximation. By Proposition 1 and the normalization of the optimal benchmark, this
mechanism is a prior-independent γ approximation. The optimal prior-independent mechanism is
no worse, i.e., β ≤ γ.
Lemma 1. For any families of distributions and mechanisms, the optimal benchmark ratio γ is at
most the prior-independent optimal ratio β, i.e., γ ≤ β.
Proof. Consider the prior-independent optimal mechanism M∗ with approximation β. Define the
benchmark
B∗(v) = βM∗(v), (1)
i.e., the benchmark is the performance of the prior-independent optimal mechanism scaled up by
its approximation factor. Taking the expectation of v drawn from any distribution F , we have
B∗(F ) = βM∗(F ). (2)
First, notice that B∗ is normalized. SinceM∗ is a prior-independent β-approximation, M∗(F ) ≥
1
β OPTF (F ) for all F in the family of distributions. Multiplying through by β and applying equa-
tion (2) shows that the benchmark meets the definition of normalization.
Second, equation (1) implies that M∗ is a prior-free β-approximation of B∗. Thus, (M∗, B∗) is
a solution to the benchmark design program (γ) with ratio β. The optimal solution to the program
is no larger. Thus, γ ≤ β.
The benchmark design problem presented above asks for both an optimal benchmark and the
optimal mechanism for this benchmark. Fixing the benchmark, the problem of identifying the
optimal mechanism is not well understood. There is a canonical method for identifying lower
bounds on the approximation ratio of the optimal mechanism. Goldberg et al. (2006) suggest that
the prior-free approximation any mechanism for a benchmark can be lower bounded by identifying a
distribution over inputs for which all non-dominated mechanisms obtain the same performance. For
revenue maximizing mechanism design, this distribution is the so-called equal revenue distribution.
The following lemma and definition generalize this lower bound to environments where a mechanism
neutralizing distribution may not exist.
Lemma 2. For any benchmark B, distribution F , and family of mechanisms which induce OPTF ,
the optimal prior-free approximation ρM is at least B(F )OPTF (F ) .
Proof. Let MB be the prior-free optimal mechanism for benchmark B, i.e., that optimizes the
program (ρB), then
ρB = max
v∈V
B(v)
MB(v)
≥ B(F )
MB(F )
≥ B(F )
OPTF (F )
.
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Definition 6. For any benchmark B, family of distributions F , and family of mechanisms which
induce OPTF , the canonical lower-bound on the optimal prior-free approximation of B is
ρ¯B = max
F∈F
B(F )
OPTF (F )
. (ρ¯B)
This lower bound holds for any family of distributions; e.g., contrasting to standard assumptions
in mechanism design, it allows distributions that are irregular and correlated. Moreover, the lower
bound is tight for a number of interesting benchmarks. By Theorem 1, the optimal benchmark B∗
satisfies ρB
∗
= ρ¯B
∗
. For the digital goods revenue maximization problem, a large family of bench-
marks were shown by Chen et al. (2014) to also satisfy this equality. Thus, a natural relaxation of
the benchmark design program is, instead of optimizing benchmarks that admit the best prior-free
approximation, to optimize benchmarks that admit the best lower bound of Definition 6.
Definition 7. The relaxed benchmark design problem for distribution family F and family of
mechanisms that defines the Bayesian optimal mechanism OPTF for and distribution F ∈ F solves
the program:
γ¯ = min
B∈B(F)
max
F∈F
B(F )
OPTF (F )
. (γ¯)
Proposition 2. The value of the relaxed program lower bounds optimal resolution, i.e., γ¯ ≤ γ.
We will see in Section 4 that the relaxation is not generally without loss and, in particular, the
optimal benchmark for the relaxed program can have γ¯ < γ. We will show the strictness of this
inequality by example for the paradigmatic problem of maximizing revenue from the sale of an item
to one of two agents and benchmarks that are normalized for value distributions that are i.i.d. and
regular. We show this inequality is strict for online learning as well.
3 Prior-Independent Optimal Mechanisms
In this section we consider the problem of maximizing revenue from the sale of a single item to
one of two agents with values distributed independently and identically from a distribution that
satisfies a natural convexity property (to be defined formally). We identify the prior-independent
optimal mechanism and thus, by the equivalence between benchmark design and prior-independent
optimization, the optimal benchmark. The section begins with preliminary discussion of mechanism
design.
3.1 Mechanism Design Preliminaries
Consider n agents with private values v = (v1, . . . , vn). The agents have linear utility given, e.g,
agent i’s utility is vi xi − pi for allocation probability xi and expected payment pi. Agents’ values
are drawn independently and identically from a product distribution F = F ×· · ·×F where F will
denote the cumulative distribution function of each agent’s value.
A mechanism M is defined by an ex post allocation and payment rule xM and pM which map
the profile of values v to a profile of allocation probabilities and a profile of payments, respectively.
We focus on mechanisms that are feasible, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and individually
rational:
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• For selling a single item, a mechanism is feasible if for all valuation profiles, the allocation
probabilities sum to at most one, i.e., ∀v, ∑i xMi (v) ≤ 1.
• A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible if no agent i with value vi prefers
to misreport some value z: ∀v, i, z, vi xMi (v) − pMi (v) ≥ vi xMi (z,v−i) − pMi (z,v−i) where
(z,v−i) denotes the valuation profile with vi replaced with z.
• A mechanism is individually rational if truthful reporting always leads to non-negative utility:
∀v, i, vi xMi (v)− pMi (v) ≥ 0.
A mechanism’s revenue can be easily and geometrically understood via the marginal revenue
approach of Myerson (1981) and Bulow and Roberts (1989). For distribution F , the quantile q
of an agent with value value v denotes how strong that agent is relative to the distribution F .
Quantiles are defined by the mapping QF (v) = 1−F (v). Denote the mapping back to value space
by VF , i.e., VF (q) is the value of the agent with quantile q. A single agent price-posting revenue
curve gives the revenue of posting a price as a function of the probability that the agent accepts the
price. For an agent with value distribution F , price VF (q) = F
−1(1−q) is accepted with probability
q; its revenue is q VF (q). A single agent revenue curve gives the optimal revenue from selling to a
single agent RF (q) as a function of ex ante sale probability q. Note that the revenue curve R is
always concave. The agent is regular if her revenue curve equals her price-posting revenue curve.
The optimal mechanism for a single agent posts the monopoly price VF (qˆ
⋆) which corresponds to
the monopoly quantile qˆ⋆ = argmaxq RF (q). The expected revenue of a multi-agent mechanism M
is equal to its surplus of marginal revenue.
Theorem 2 (Myerson, 1981). Given any incentive-compatible mechanism M with allocation rule
xM (v), the expected revenue of mechanism M for agents with regular distribution F is equal to its
expected surplus of marginal revenue, i.e.,
M(F ) =
∑
i
Ev∼F
[
pMi (v)
]
=
∑
i
Ev∼F
[
R′F (QF (vi))x
M
i (v)
]
.
Corollary 2 (Myerson, 1981). For i.i.d., regular, single-item environments, the optimal mechanism
OPTF is the second-price auction with reserve equal to the monopoly price.
Proof. Optimizing marginal revenue pointwise the item is assigned to the agent with the highest
non-negative marginal revenue. Since agents are i.i.d. and the marginal revenue curves are mono-
tonically non-increasing, this winning agent is the one with the highest value that exceeds the
monopoly price.
The following lemma from Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) follows from Theorem 2 and gives a
geometric understanding of revenue in two-agent auctions.
Lemma 3 (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015). In i.i.d. two-agent single-item environments, the expected
revenue of the second price auction is twice the area under the revenue curve and the expected
revenue of the optimal mechanism is twice the area under the smallest monotone concave upper
bound of the revenue curve.
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3.2 Prior-independent Optimization
In the remainder of this section we solve for the prior-independent optimal mechanism for the
revenue objective with the restriction to
• single-item, two-agent environments, i.e., n = 2 (implicit);
• the family of i.i.d. regular value distribution FReg; and
• the family of feasible, incentive compatible, individually rational, and scale-invariant mecha-
nisms MSI.
The following discussion motivates these restrictions. The single-item two-agent environment is
canonical for prior-independent revenue maximization. There do not exist good prior-independent
mechanisms for general asymmetric and irregularly distributed agent values. Almost all papers on
prior-independent mechanism design restrict to i.i.d. agents. Almost all papers on revenue max-
imization for prior-independent mechanism design restrict to regular distributions. The restric-
tion to feasible and individually rational mechanisms is required to have a sensible optimization
problem. The restriction to incentive compatible mechanisms is made in almost all papers on
prior-independent mechanism design, an exception is Feng and Hartline (2018) where it is shown
that the restriction can be lossy. The remaining condition which we formally define below is scale
invariance.
Definition 8. Given any incentive-compatible mechanism M with allocation rule xM (v), mech-
anism M is scale invariant if for each agent i, valuation profile v and any constant α > 0,
xMi (α · v) = xMi (v). Scale invariance further implies M(a · v) = a ·M(v).
Allouah and Besbes (2018) prove that the optimal prior-independent mechanism among a broad
family of mechanisms is scale invariant. They show that if limα→0 xi(α · v) always exists for
mechanisms in the family, then the optimal prior-independent mechanism is scale invariant. They
conjecture that this weaker assumption is without loss; if true, the mechanism we identify as the
optimal mechanism among scale-invariant mechanisms is also prior-independent optimal among all
mechanisms.
Given the restriction to scale-invariant mechanisms, it will be sufficient to consider distributions
that are normalized so that the single-agent optimal revenue is maxq R(q) = 1.
The following family of (stochastic) markup mechanisms is (essentially, in n = 2 agent environ-
ments) the restriction of the family of lookahead mechanisms (Ronen, 2001) to those that are scale
invariant. Notice that the second-price auction is the 1-markup mechanism M1.
Definition 9. The r-markup mechanism Mr identifies the agent with the highest-value (and ties
broken uniformly at random) and offers this agent r times the second-highest value. A stochastic
markup mechanism draws r from a given distribution on [1,∞). The family of stochastic markup
mechanisms is MSMKUP.
Theorem 3. For i.i.d., regular, two-agent, single-item environments, the optimal scale-invariant,
incentive-compatible mechanism for prior-independent optimization program (β) is Mα∗,r∗ which
randomizes over the second-price auction M1 with probability α
∗ and r∗-markup mechanism Mr∗
with probability 1 − α∗, where α∗ ≈ 0.806 and r∗ ≈ 2.447. The worst-case regular distribution
for this mechanism is triangle distribution Triq¯∗ with q¯
∗ ≈ 0.093 and its approximation ratio is
β ≈ 1.907.
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In the two sections below we prove this theorem with the following main steps. First, we
characterize the prior-independent optimal mechanism under the restriction to stochastic markup
mechanisms and triangle distributions, cf. Alaei et al. (2018). This restricted program has the same
solution as is given in Theorem 3. Second we show that the stochastic markup mechanisms and
triangle distributions are mutual best responses among the more general families of scale-invariant
mechanisms and regular distributions. Combining these results gives the theorem.
3.3 Stochastic Markup Mechanisms versus Triangle Distributions
In this section we characterize the solution to the prior-independent optimization program restricted
to stochastic markup mechanisms and triangle distributions. We first define triangle distributions,
which have revenue curves shaped like triangles (Figure 1), as well as a more general family of
truncated distributions, which will be important subsequently in the proof. Recall that for scale-
invariant mechanisms, it is without loss to normalize the distributions to have monopoly revenue
one.
Definition 10. A normalized triangle distribution with monopoly quantile q¯, denoted Triq¯, is
defined by the quantile function
QTriq¯(v) =
{
1
1+v(1−q¯) v ≤ 1/q¯
0 otherwise.
The triangulation of a normalized distribution with monopoly quantile q¯ is Triq¯. The family of
normalized triangle distributions is FTri = {Triq¯ : q¯ ∈ [0, 1]}.
Definition 11. A distribution is truncated if the highest-point in its support is the monopoly price
(typically a point mass). The truncation of a distribution is the distribution that replaces every
point above the monopoly price with the monopoly price. The family of truncated distributions is
denoted FTrunc.
The three lemmas below give formulae for the revenue of the optimal mechanism, the second-
price auction, and non-trivial markup mechanisms for triangle distributions. The formula for
revenue of markup mechanisms is discontinuous at r = 1. Thus, in our discussion we will distinguish
between the second-price auction M1 and non-trivial markup mechanism Mr for r > 1.
Lemma 4. For i.i.d., normalized truncated, two-agent, single-item environments, the optimal
mechanism posts the monopoly price and obtains revenue 2 − q¯ where q¯ is the probability that
an agent’s value equals the monopoly price.
Proof. The smallest monotone concave function that upper bounds the revenue curve is a trapezoid;
its area is q¯/2+ 1 − q¯. The optimal revenue from two agents, by Lemma 3, is twice this area, i.e.,
2− q¯.
Lemma 5. The revenue of the second-price auctionM1 for distribution Triq¯ is 1, i.e., M1(Triq¯) = 1.
Proof. By Lemma 3, the revenue is twice the area under the revenue curve. That area is 1/2; thus,
the revenue is 1.
10
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Figure 1: The left hand side is the revenue curve for triangle distribution Triq¯ and the right hand
side is the revenue curve for quadrilateral distribution Qrq¯,q¯′,r. The definition of quadrilateral
distribution Qrq¯,q¯′,r will be formally introduced later in Section 3.4.
Lemma 6. The revenue of the r-markup mechanisms Mr on triangle distribution Triq¯, for r ∈
(1,∞) and q¯ ∈ [0, 1), is
Mr(Triq¯) =
2r
(1− q¯)(r − 1)

 1− q¯
1− q¯ + q¯r +
ln
(
r
1−q¯+q¯r
)
1− r

 .
The proof of Lemma 6 is straightforward and given in Appendix A.
The following theorem characterizes the prior-independent optimal stochastic markup mecha-
nism against triangle distributions. The parameters of this optimal mechanism are the solution
to an algebraic expression (cf. Lemma 6) that we are unable to solve analytically. Our proof will
instead combine numeric calculations of select points in parameter space with theoretical analysis
to rule out most of the parameter space. For the remaining parameter space, we can show that
the expression is well-behaved and, thus, numeric calculation can identify near optimal parameters.
Discussion of this hybrid numerical and theoretical analysis can be found in Appendix A.
Before giving Theorem 4, we give context for its proof. In abstract terms, the prior-independent
optimization program (β) can be viewed as a zero sum game between the designer and an adversary,
where the designer chooses a prior-independent mechanism M , the adversary chooses a worst-case
distribution F (and its induced revenue curve), and the payoff of the designer is the approximation
ratio OPTF (F )/M(F ) (see Definition 2).
Theorem 4. For i.i.d., triangle distribution, two-agent, single-item environments, the optimal
stochastic markup mechanism for prior-independent optimization program (β) is Mα∗,r∗ which ran-
domizes over the second-price auction M1 with probability α
∗ and r∗-markup mechanism Mr∗ with
probability 1−α∗, where α∗ ≈ 0.806 and r∗ ≈ 2.447. The worst-case distribution for this mechanism
is the triangle distribution Triq¯∗ with q¯
∗ ≈ 0.093 and its approximation ratio is β ≈ 1.907.
Proof. The approach of this proof is to identify the triangle Triq¯∗ for which the designer is indifferent
between the second price auction M1 and the optimal (non-trivial) markup mechanism, denoted
Mr∗ . For such a distribution Triq¯∗ , the designer is also indifferent (in minimizing the approximation
ratio) between any mixture over M1 (with probability α) and Mr∗ (with probability 1 − α), and
all other r-markup mechanisms for r 6∈ {1, r∗} are inferior (Figure 2). We then identify the α∗
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Figure 2: The figure on the left plots, as a function of q¯, the approximation ratio APX1(q¯) of the
second-price auction M1 against triangle distribution Triq¯ (straight line), and the approximation
ratio APX∗(q¯) of the optimal non-trivial markup mechanism against triangle distribution Triq¯
(curved line). These functions cross at q¯∗ = 0.0931057. The figure on the right plots the revenue
of the r markup mechanism Mr on triangle distribution Triq¯∗ as a function of markup r, i.e.,
Mr(Triq¯∗). Notice that, by choice of q¯
∗, the optimal non-trivial markup mechanism has the same
revenue as the second-price auction.
for which the adversary’s best response (in maximizing the approximation ratio) to Mα∗,r∗ is the
distribution Triq¯∗ . This solution Mα∗,r∗ and Triq¯∗ is a Nash equilibrium between the designer and
adversary and, thus, it solves the prior-independent optimization problem. The parameters can be
numerically identified as α∗ ≈ 0.80564048, r∗ ≈ 2.4469452, q¯∗ ≈ 0.0931057, and the approximation
ratio is β ≈ 1.9068943.
First, we identify the triangle distribution q¯∗ and the r∗ for which M1 and Mr∗ obtain the
same ratio. Denote the approximation ratio for the second-price auction M1 as APX1(q¯) = 2 − q¯
(the ratio of Lemma 4 to Lemma 5), which is continuous in q¯. Denote the approximation ratio of
the optimal markup mechanism against distribution Triq¯ by APX∗(q¯) = supr>1
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
Mr(Triq¯)
. By
Lemma 6, the approximation ratio APX∗(q¯) is continuous in q¯ as well. It is easy to verify that
APX1(0) = 2 > APX∗(0) = 1 while APX1(1) = 1 < APX∗(1) = ∞. By continuity, there exists
a q¯∗ where these two functions cross, i.e., APX∗(q¯
∗) = APX1(q¯
∗). See Figure 2. By numerical
calculation, q¯∗ ≈ 0.0931057, and
r∗ = argmax
r>1
OPTTriq¯∗ (Triq¯∗)
Mr(Triq¯∗)
≈ 2.4469452.
Now, fixing r∗, we search for α∗ for which the adversary maximizes the approximation ratio of
mechanism Mα∗,r∗ by selecting triangle distribution Triq¯∗ . Denote by q¯r(α) the monopoly quantile
as a function of α for the triangle distribution that maximizes the approximation ratio of mechanism
Mα,r, i.e.,
q¯r(α) = argmax
q¯
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
Mα,r(Triq¯)
.
By numerical calculation, for any r ∈ [2.445, 2.449], q¯r(0.81) < q¯∗ < q¯r(0.8). Continuity of q¯r(·)
for r ∈ [2.445, 2.449] and α ∈ [0.8, 0.81] (formally proved in Appendix A), then implies that there
exists α∗ such that q¯r∗(α
∗) = q¯∗. By numerical calculation, α∗ ≈ 0.80564048.
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3.4 Mutual best-response of Stochastic Markup Mechanisms and Triangle Dis-
tributions
In this section we show that stochastic markup mechanisms are a best response (for the designer) to
truncated distributions and that truncated distributions are a best response (for the adversary) to
stochastic markup mechanisms. Moreover, we show that among truncated distributions, triangle
distributions are the best for the adversary. Triangle distributions are known to be worst case
for other questions of interest in mechanism design, e.g., approximation by anonymous reserves
and anonymous pricings (Alaei et al., 2018). The proof that triangle distributions are worst-case
for two-agent prior-independent revenue maximization is significantly more involved than these
previous results.
Theorem 5. For i.i.d., two-agent, single-item environments and any scale-invariant incentive-
compatible mechanism M , there is a stochastic markup mechanism M ′ with (weakly) higher revenue
(and weakly lower approximation ratio) on every truncated distribution F . I.e., M ′(F ) ≥M(F ).
Proof. In a stochastic markup mechanism the price of the higher agent is a stochastic multiplicative
factor r ≥ 1 of the value of the lower agent (with ties broken randomly). To prove this theorem
we must argue that (a) if the agents are not tied, then revenue improves if the lower agent loses,
(b) if the agents are tied, then revenue is unaffected by random tie-breaking, and (c) any such
scale-invariant mechanism looks to the higher-valued agent like a stochastic posted pricing with
price that is a multiplicative factor (at least one) of the lower-valued agent’s value.
To see (a), note that the revenue of the mechanism is equal to its virtual surplus (Theorem 2)
and for triangle distributions only the highest value in the support of the distribution has positive
virtual value. Thus, any mechanism that sells to a strictly-lower-valued agent can be improved by
not selling to such an agent.
To see (b), note that for any i.i.d. distribution the revenue of any mechanism is invariant to
randomly permuting the identities of the agents. Thus, we can assume random tie-breaking.
To see (c), recall that the family of incentive-compatible single-agent mechanisms is equivalent
to the family of random price postings. Once we have ruled out selling to the lower-valued agent, the
mechanism is a single-agent mechanism for the higher-valued agent (with price at least the lower-
valued agent’s value. By the assumption that the mechanism is scale invariant, the distribution of
prices offered to the higher-valued agent must be multiplicative scalings of the lower-valued agent’s
value.
Next we will give a sequence of results that culminate in the observation that for any regular
distribution and any stochastic markup mechanism with probability α at least 2/3 on the second-
price auction (which includes the optimal mechanism from Theorem 4) either the triangulation of
the distribution or the point mass Tri1 has (weakly) higher approximation ratio. As the notation
indicates, the point mass distribution Tri1 is a triangle distribution.
Theorem 6. For i.i.d., two-agent, single-item environments and any regular distribution F and
any stochastic markup mechanism M that places probability α ∈ [2/3, 1] on the second-price auc-
tion, either the triangulation of the distribution FTri or the point mass Tri1 has (weakly) higher
approximation ratio. I.e., max
{
OPT
FTri
(FTri)
M(FTri)
,
OPTTri1 (Tri1)
M(Tri1)
}
≥ OPTF (F )M(F ) .
To prove this theorem we give a sequence of results showing that for any regular distribution,
a corresponding truncated distribution is only worse; for any truncated distribution and a fixed
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Figure 3: The illustration of the revenue decomposition of Lemma 7 for M on distribution F and
truncation F ′ for the optimal mechanism and second-price auction. The thin black line on the left
and right figures are the revenue curves corresponding to F and F ′, respectively. The dashed area
on the left represents OPT+ = SPA+ and the gray area on the left represents OPT− = OPT
′
−.
The dashed area on the right represents OPT′+ = SPA
′
+ and the gray area on the right represents
SPA′− = SPA−.
stochastic markup mechanism (that mixes over M1 and some Mr), a corresponding quadrilateral
distribution (based on r) is only worse; and for any quadrilateral distribution, a corresponding
triangle distribution (independent of r) is only worse. The theorem follows from combining these
results. The first step assumes that the probability that the stochastic markup mechanism places
on the second price auction is α ∈ [1/2, 1]; the last step further assumes that α ∈ [2/3, 1].
To begin, the following lemma shows that the best response of the adversary to a relevant
stochastic markup mechanism is a truncated distribution. Recall that by Fu et al. (2015) the
prior-independent optimal mechanism is strictly better than a 2-approximation. On the other
hand, any stochastic markup mechanism that places probability α on the second-price auction M1
has prior-independent approximation at least 1/α. Specifically, on the (degenerate) distribution
that places all probability mass on 1, a.k.a. Tri1, the approximation factor of such a stochastic
markup mechanism is exactly 1/α. We conclude that all relevant stochastic markup mechanisms
place probability α > 1/2 on the second-price auction. Thus, this lemma applies to all relevant
mechanisms.
Lemma 7. For i.i.d., two-agent, single-item environments, any regular distribution F , and any
stochastic markup mechanism M that places probability α ∈ [1/2, 1] on the second-price auction;
either the truncation of the distribution F ′ or the point mass distribution Tri1 has (weakly) higher
approximation ratio. I.e., max
{
OPTF ′(F
′)
M(F ′) ,
OPTTri1 (Tri1)
M(Tri1)
}
≥ OPTF (F )M(F ) .
Proof. It can be assumed that the approximation of stochastic markup mechanism M on distribu-
tion F is at least 1/α (where α denotes the probability that M places on the second-price auction).
Notice that the revenue M on the point mass on 1 (a truncated distribution) is α and the optimal
revenue on this distribution is 1. If the approximation factor OPTF (F )/M(F ) is less than 1/α then the
point mass on 1 (a truncated distribution) achieves a higher approximation than F and the lemma
follows. For the remainder of the proof, assume that the approximation factor of mechanism M on
distribution F is more than 1/α.
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View the stochastic markup mechanism M as a distribution over two mechanisms: the second-
price auction M1 with probability α, and M∗, a distribution over non-trivial markup mechanisms
Mr with r > 1, with probability 1− α. The optimal mechanism is OPTF . Decompose the revenue
from distribution F across these three mechanisms as follows. Denote the monopoly quantile of F
by q¯. See Figure 3.
• OPT+ and OPT− give the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism from agents with
values above and below the monopoly price (below and above the monopoly quantile q¯).
• SPA+ = OPT+ and SPA− give the expected revenue of the second-price auction M1 from
agents with values above and below the monopoly price.
• MKUP+ and MKUP− give the expected revenue of the stochastic markup mechanism M∗
from prices (strictly) above and (weakly) below the monopoly price.
Consider truncating the distribution F at the monopoly quantile q¯ to obtain F ′ ∈ FTrunc. Define
analogous quantities (with identities):
• OPT′+ < OPT+ and OPT
′
− = OPT−.
Identities follow from the geometric analysis of Lemma 3.
• SPA′+ = OPT
′
+ and SPA
′
− = SPA−.
Identities follow from the geometric analysis of Lemma 3.
• MKUP′+ = 0 and MKUP
′
− = MKUP−.
Values above the monopoly price are not supported by the truncated distribution, so the
revenue from those prices is zero. On the other hand, prices (weakly) below the monopoly
price are bought with the exact same probability as the cumulative distribution function F ′
and F are the same for these prices.
The remainder of the proof follows a straightforward calculation. Write the approximation ratio of
M on distribution F (using the given identities) and rearrange:
OPTF (F )
M(F )
=
OPT++OPT−
α (OPT++SPA−) + (1− α) (MKUP++MKUP−)
=
OPT++ [OPT−]
α OPT++ [α SPA−+(1− α) (MKUP++MKUP−)]
Since the approximation ratio on F is at least 1/α, the ratio of the first term in the numerator and
denominator is at most the ratio of the remaining terms [in brackets]:
1
α
=
OPT+
α OPT+
≤ [OPT−]
[α SPA−+(1− α) (MKUP++MKUP−)]
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Figure 4: The main two steps of Lemma 9 are illustrated. In the first step (right-hand side), the
revenue curves of distributions FTrunc (thin, solid, black) and F † (thick, dashed, gray) are depicted.
In the second step, the revenue curves of the distributions F † (thin, solid, black) and FQr (thick,
dashed, gray) are depicted. In both cases the revenue of the r-markup mechanism is is higher on
the thin, solid, black curve than the thick, dashed, gray curve.
Now write the approximation ratio of M on truncation F ′ (using the given identities) and bound:
OPTF ′(F
′)
M(F ′)
=
OPT′++ [OPT−]
α OPT′++ [α SPA−+(1− α) MKUP−]
≥ OPT
′
++ [OPT−]
α OPT′++ [α SPA−+(1− α) (MKUP++MKUP−)]
≥ OPT++ [OPT−]
α OPT++ [α SPA−+(1− α) (MKUP++MKUP−)]
=
OPTF (F )
M(F )
.
The calculation shows that, for any distribution F , the truncated distribution F ′ increases the
approximation factor of the stochastic markup mechanism. Thus, the worst-case distribution is
truncated.
The next step is to show that, among truncated distributions, the worst-case distribution for
stochastic markup mechanisms are those with quadrilateral-shaped revenue curves, i.e., ones that
are piecewise linear with three pieces (see Figure 1). Recall that for a truncated distribution at
monopoly quantile q¯, the upper bound of the support is a point mass on 1/q¯.
Definition 12. A normalized quadrilateral distribution with parameters q¯, q¯′ and r with r ≥ 1 and
q¯r
q¯r+(1−q¯) ≤ q¯′≤ min{rq¯, 1}, denoted by Qrq¯,q¯′,r is defined by quantile function as:
QQrq¯,q¯′,r(v) =


q¯′
q¯′+vrq¯(1−q¯′) v <
1/rq¯
q¯′q¯(r−1)
vrq¯(q¯′−q¯)+(rq¯−q¯′)
1/rq¯ ≤ v ≤ 1/q¯
0 1/q¯ < v
The following lemma summarizes an analysis from Allouah and Besbes (2018) and is useful in
bounding the revenue from markup mechanisms.
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Lemma 8 (Allouah and Besbes, 2018). Consider the r-markup mechanism, two i.i.d. regular agents
with value distribution F , quantile q¯′ corresponding to the monopoly price divided by r, and the
distribution F˜ that corresponds to F ironed on [q¯′, 1]: the virtual surplus from quantiles [q¯′, 1] is
higher for F than for F˜ .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is technical and non-trivial. It is given in the proof of Proposition 4
of Allouah and Besbes (2018).
The next lemma reduces the worst case distribution from the family of truncated distributions
to the family of quadrilateral distributions. The reduction is illustrated in Figure 4, by showing
that ironing the revenue curves sequentially within [q¯, q¯′] and [q¯′, 1] decreases the revenue of the
stochastic markup mechanism. The optimal revenue is not affected because it is obtained using
a reserve price corresponding to the monopoly quantile q¯ and it is agnostic to the shape of the
revenue curve for q > q¯.
Lemma 9. For i.i.d., two-agent, single-item environments, any truncated distribution FTrunc,
and any stochastic markup mechanism Mα,r with probability α on the second-price auction M1
and probability 1 − α on non-trivial markup mechanism Mr; there is a quadrilateral distribution
FQr with the same optimal revenue and (weakly) lower revenue in Mα,r. I.e., OPTFQr(F
Qr) =
OPTFTrunc(F
Trunc) and Mα,r(F
Qr) ≤Mα,r(FTrunc).
Proof. On any normalized truncated distribution with monopoly quantile q¯, the optimal revenue is
2−q¯ (Lemma 4). Thus, to prove the lemma it is sufficient to show that for any truncated distribution
FTrunc ∈ FTrunc with monopoly quantile q¯ there is a normalized quadrilateral distribution FQr ∈
FQr ⊂ FTrunc with monopoly quantile q¯ and lower revenue in Mα,r.
The quadrilateral distribution FQr is obtained by ironing FTrunc on [q¯, q¯′] and [q¯′, 1] where
quantile q¯′ satisfies VFTrunc(q¯) = r VFTrunc(q¯
′). We consider an intermediary distribution F † that is
FTrunc ironed only on [q¯, q¯′]. See Figure 4. The proof approach is to show that Mα,r(F
Trunc) >
Mα,r(F
†) > Mα,r(F
Qr).
As Mα,r is a convex combination of the second-price auction M1 and the r-markup mechanism
Mr. It suffices to show the inequalities above hold for both auctions. In fact, the result holds for the
second-price auction from the geometric analysis of revenue of Lemma 3. The revenue of the second-
price auction for two i.i.d. agents is twice the area under the revenue curve. As the revenue curve
has strictly smaller area from FTrunc to F † to FQr, we have M1(F
Trunc) > M1(F
†) > M1(F
Qr).
Below, we analyze the r-markup mechanism Mr.
The following price-based analysis shows that Mr(F
Trunc) > Mr(F
†):
• The revenue from quantiles in [0, q¯] is unchanged.
These quantiles are offered prices from quantiles in [q¯′, 1]. The values of quantiles [0, q¯] and
[q¯′, 1] are the same for both distributions; thus, the revenue is unchanged.
• The revenue from quantiles in [q¯, q¯′] decreases.
These quantiles are offered prices from quantiles in [q¯′, 1]. For the distribution F † relative to
FTrunc: Values are lower at any quantile q ∈ [q¯, q¯′]; the distribution of prices (from quantiles
in [q¯′, 1]) is the same. Thus, revenue is lower.
• The revenue from quantiles in [q¯′, 1] is unchanged.
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Figure 5: Illustrating the proof of Lemma 10, the difference of revenue for second price auction M1
on revenue curves Rq¯′ and Rq¯′′ , which respectively correspond to quadrilateral distributions Qrq¯,q¯′,r
and Qrq¯,q¯′′,r, is equal to twice of the gray area, which is at least q¯
′′ − q¯′. Moreover, the difference of
revenue for the r-markup mechanism Mr on revenue curves Rq¯′ and Rq¯′′ is at most 2(q¯
′′ − q¯′).
These quantiles are in [q¯′, 1] and are offered prices from quantiles in [q¯′, 1]. The distributions
are the same for these quantiles; thus, the revenue is unchanged.
The following virtual-surplus-based analysis shows that Mr(F
†) > Mr(F
Qr):
• The virtual surplus of quantiles in [0, q¯] is unchanged.
These quantiles have the same virtual values under the two distributions and the same prob-
ability of winning, i.e., 1− q¯′ (when the other agent’s quantile is in [q¯′, 1].
• The virtual surplus of quantiles in [q¯, q¯′] is decreased.
Their prices come from quantiles in [q¯′, 1] which are decreased; thus, their probabilities of
winning are increased. Their virtual values are negative, so these increased probabilities of
winning result in decreased virtual surplus.
• The virtual surplus of quantiles in [q¯′, 1] is decreased.
This result is given by Lemma 8.
We complete the proof of Theorem 6 by showing that triangle distributions lead to lower revenue
than quadrilateral distributions. The intuition of the proof is illustrated in Figure 5. For any r > 1
and any stochastic markup mechanism Mα,r with probability α ∈ [2/3, 1], consider a family of
quadrilateral distributions Qrq¯,q¯′,r parameterized by q¯
′. The optimal revenue is again not affected
by q¯′while the revenue of Mα,r is monotone increasing in q¯
′. Thus the approximation ratio of Mα,r
is maximized by minimal q¯′ for which the degenerate quadrilateral Qrq¯,q¯′,r is a triangle.
Lemma 10. For i.i.d., two-agent, single-item environments, normalized quadrilateral distribution
Qrq¯,q¯′,r, and stochastic markup mechanism Mα,r with probability α ∈ [2/3, 1] on the second-price
auction M1 and probability 1 − α on non-trivial markup mechanism Mr; the triangle distribution
Triq¯ has the same optimal revenue and (weakly) lower revenue in Mα,r. I.e., OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯) =
OPTQrq¯,q¯′,r(Qrq¯,q¯′,r) and Mα,r(Triq¯) ≤Mα,r(Qrq¯,q¯′,r).
Proof. By Lemma 4, the optimal revenues for quadrilateral distribution Qrq¯,q¯′,r and triangle dis-
tribution Triq¯ are the same (and equal to 2 − q¯). To show that the revenue of Mα,r is worse on
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Triq¯ than Qrq¯,q¯′,r, it suffices to show that the revenue on Qrq¯,q¯′,r is monotonically increasing in q¯
′.
Specifically the minimum revenue is when the quadrilateral distribution is degenerately equal to
the triangle distribution.
The proof strategy is to lower bound the partial derivative with respect to q¯′ of the revenues of
r-markup mechanism and the second-price auction for quadrilateral distributions Qrq¯,q¯′,r as
∂Mr(Qrq¯,q¯′,r)
∂q¯′
≥ −2, (3)
∂M1(Qrq¯,q¯′,r)
∂q¯′
≥ 1. (4)
Thus, for mechanism Mα,r with α ≥ 2/3, we have
∂Mα,r(Qrq¯,q¯′,r)
∂q¯′
≥ α− 2(1− α) ≥ 0
and revenue is minimized with the smallest choice of q¯′ for which quadrilateral distribution Qrq¯,q¯′,r
is degenerately a triangle distribution. It remains to prove bounds (3) and (4).
For simplicity, since in this section the only parameter we change in distribution Qrq¯,q¯′,r is q¯
′,
we introduce the notation Pq¯′(v) to denote the revenue of posting price v, and Vq¯′(q) to denote the
price v given quantile q when the distribution is Qrq¯,q¯′,r. The proof is illustrated in Figure 5.
We now prove bound (3). For any pair of quadrilateral distributions Qrq¯,q¯′,r and Qrq¯,q¯′′,r with
q¯′′ ≥ q¯′, we analyze the difference in revenue for posting price r · v(2).
Mr(Qrq¯,q¯′′,r)−Mr(Qrq¯,q¯′,r)
= 2
∫ 1
q¯′′
Pq¯′′(r · Vq¯′′(q)) dq − 2
∫ 1
q¯′
Pq¯′(r · Vq¯′(q)) dq
≥ 2
∫ 1
q¯′′
Pq¯′′(r · Vq¯′′(q)) dq − 2
∫ 1
q¯′′
Pq¯′(r · Vq¯′(q)) dq − 2(q¯′′ − q¯′)
≥ 2
∫ 1
q¯′′
Pq¯′(r · Vq¯′′(q)) dq − 2
∫ 1
q¯′′
Pq¯′(r · Vq¯′(q)) dq − 2(q¯′′ − q¯′)
≥ −2(q¯′′ − q¯′).
The first equality is constructed as follows: Both agents face a random price that is r times the
value of the other agent who has quantile q drawn from U [0, 1]. The revenue from this price is given
by, e.g., Pq¯′(r · Vq¯′(q)) which is 0 when q ≤ q¯′. The first inequality holds because Pq¯′(r · Vq¯′(q)) ≤ 1
for any quantile q. The second inequality holds since the revenue from revenue curve Pq¯′′ is weakly
higher than from revenue curve Pq¯′ for any value v. The third inequality holds because (a) the
prices of the first integral are higher than the prices of the second integral, i.e., Vq¯′′(q) ≥ Vq¯′(q) for
every q, and (b) because these prices are below the monopoly price for distribution Qrq¯,q¯′′,r and so
higher prices give higher revenue.
Therefore, we have
∂Mr(Qrq¯,q¯′,r)
∂q¯′
= lim
q¯′′→q¯′
Mr(Qrq¯,q¯′′,r)−Mr(Qrq¯,q¯′,r)
q¯′′ − q¯′ ≥ −2.
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We now prove bound (4). The revenue of the second price auction for two i.i.d. agents is twice
the area under the revenue curve (Lemma 3). For quadrilateral distribution Qrq¯,q¯′,r this revenue is
calculated as:
M1(Qrq¯,q¯′,r) = 2
∫ 1
0
Rq¯′(q) dq
= 2
∫ q¯
0
Rq¯′(q) dq + 2
∫ q¯′
q¯
Rq¯′(q) dq + 2
∫ 1
q¯′
Rq¯′(q) dq
= q¯ + (q¯′− q¯)(1 + q¯
′
r · q¯ ) + (1− q¯
′)
q¯′
r · q¯
= q¯′+ (1− q¯) q¯
′
r · q¯ .
Therefore, we have
∂M1(Qrq¯,q¯′,r)
∂q¯′
= 1 +
1− q¯
r · q¯ ≥ 1.
4 Sub-optimality of Relaxed Benchmark Design
In this section, we will show that the relaxed benchmark design program (γ¯) is not generally equal to
the benchmark design program (γ) by considering the revenue maximization problem for two agents
with i.i.d. regular distributions. Since benchmark optimization and prior-independent mechanism
design are equivalent problems (see Section 3, Theorem 1), a gap between the objective values γ¯
and γ of programs (γ¯) and (γ) is implied by exhibiting a benchmark with lower objective value in
program (γ¯) than the approximation achieved by the optimal prior-independent mechanism, i.e.,
the solution to program (β).
We first establish a gap in the value of these programs under the restriction to triangle distri-
butions.
Theorem 7. For i.i.d. triangle distributions, two-agent, single-item environments and scale-invariant,
incentive-compatible mechanisms the heuristic benchmark optimization program (γ¯) has a strictly
smaller objective value than the benchmark optimization program (γ), i.e., γ¯ < γ.
This section follows the notations and definitions introduced in Section 3. LetMα∗,r∗ be the ap-
proximately optimal prior-independent mechanism with numerical parameters α∗ = 0.80564048, r∗ =
2.4469452 (Theorem 3). We first define the pseudo-mechanism M˜ as the affine combination of mech-
anisms with revenue M˜(v) = (1+ δ)Mα∗,r∗(v)− δM1.1(v), where δ > 0 is a small constant. Recall
that FTri is the family of triangle distributions. We show that
1. ∀F ∈ FTri, M˜(F ) ≤ OPTF (F );
2. ∀F ∈ FTri, β′ M˜(F ) ≥ OPTF (F ), where β′ < β.
Letting B(v) = β′ M˜(v), benchmark B is normalized for all triangle distributions and the approxi-
mation of optimal payoff against benchmark B is β′ < β = γ. Therefore, the approximation of the
optimal heuristic benchmark is γ¯ ≤ β′ < γ and Theorem 7 holds.
We first prove that the first statement holds by showing a more general lemma for regular
distributions with proof deferred at the end of the section.
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Lemma 11. For i.i.d., two-agent, regular, single-item environments, any constants 1 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤
r3, and any constants a, b, c ≥ 0 such that a+ b− c ≤ 1, a ≥ c, b ≥ c:
M˜(F ) = aMr1(F ) + bMr3(F )− cMr2(F ) ≤ OPTF (F ).
Our approach to show that the second statement holds is as follows. Recall that the benchmark
program (γ) has value 1.9068943. It will suffice then to show that on triangle distributions defined
by monopoly quantile q¯ close to q¯∗ = 0.0931057, where the prior-independent optimal mechanism
Mα∗,r∗ obtains revenue at least 1.9068943, that M1.1 performs very badly (specifically, it is worse
than a 2-approximation). Moreover, on distributions with monopoly quantile q¯ far from q¯∗, mech-
anism Mα∗,r∗ does much better than it does on worst case distributions (specifically, it is better
than a 1.9041 approximation). The theorem will follow by combining these observations.
The following lemmas establish the two main steps of the argument. These lemmas are based on
our formula for the revenue Mr(Triq¯) as given by Lemma 6. We evaluate the formula for monopoly
quantiles q¯ in a grid and then use the smoothness of the revenue formula that is established in
Appendix A to show that the revenue for all monopoly quantiles in the desired range satisfy the
desired bound. The formal proof of these lemmas is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 12. For i.i.d., two-agent, single-item environments, and any quantile q¯ ∈ [0.05, 0.25], the
approximation of mechanism M1.1 on triangle distribution Triq¯ is at least 2.
Lemma 13. For i.i.d., two-agent, single-item environments, and any quantile q¯ 6∈ [0.05, 0.25], the
approximation of mechanism Mα∗,r∗ on triangle distribution Triq¯ is at most 1.9041.
To complete the proof of Theorem 7, we combine these lemmas as follows. Setting δ = 0.00154,
for q¯ ∈ [0.05, 0.25], by Lemma 12 and Theorem 3, we have
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
Ev∼F
[
M˜(v)
] = OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
(1 + δ)Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯)− δM1.1(Triq¯)
≤ OPTTriq¯(Triq¯)
1+δ
1.9068943 OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)− δ2 OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
≤ 1.90676.
For q¯ 6∈ [0.05, 0.25], we have M1.1(Triq¯) ≤ OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯), and by Lemma 13,
OPTTriq¯(Triq¯)
Ev∼F
[
M˜(v)
] = OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
(1 + δ)Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯)− δM1.1(Triq¯)
≤ OPTTriq¯(Triq¯)
1+δ
1.9041 OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)− δ OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
≤ 1.90676.
Therefore, the gap between program (γ¯) and (γ) is at least 10−4 for triangle distributions.
Theorem 7 can be generalized, from the restriction to triangle distributions, to regular distri-
butions. This result is summarized below in Theorem 8 and its proof is given in Appendix B. The
argument generalizes Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 to give bounds on markup mechanisms’ revenues
for regular distributions that are close to or far from the worst-case triangle distribution Triq¯∗ . A
key part of the proof is an appropriate definition of closeness.
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[0, q¯] [q¯, q¯′] [q¯′, 1]
R¯F (VF (q) · r1) R¯F (VF (q)) 1 1
−R¯F (VF (q) · r2) −R¯F (VF (q) · r3) −R¯F (VF (q) · r3) −R¯F (VF (q) · r1)
R¯F (VF (q) · r3) R¯F (VF (q)) 1 1
Figure 6: Bounds on revenues for the three markup mechanisms in three quantile ranges are
shown. As a and b are both at least c, we can combine bounds Mr2 with appropriate bounds for
Mr1 and Mr3 to obtain: b R¯F (VF (q) · r3) − c R¯F (VF (q) · r2) ≤ (b − c) R¯F (VF (q)) for q ∈ [0, q¯] and
a R¯F (VF (q) · r1) + b R¯F (VF (q) · r3)− c R¯F (VF (q) · r2) ≤ (a+ b− c) for q ∈ [q¯, 1].
Theorem 8. For i.i.d., regular, two-agent, single-item environments and scale-invariant, incentive-
compatible mechanisms the heuristic benchmark optimization program (γ¯) has a strictly smaller
objective value than the benchmark optimization program (γ), i.e., γ¯ < γ.
Note that the parameters for the benchmark and the analysis of Theorem 7 and Theorem 8
are not optimized for the relaxed benchmark program. The main message of this section is just to
show that the gap exists and that the relaxed benchmark program is inappropriate for optimizing
benchmarks.
Proof of Lemma 11. Let q¯ be the monopoly quantile of normalized distribution F (i.e., with monopoly
revenue 1). For convenience, denote the revenue as a function of price as R¯F (v) = RF (QF (v)).
Let q¯′= QF (VF (q¯)/r2) be the quantile that corresponds to the monopoly reserve divided by r2. The
proof follows from the bounds in Figure 6 (derived below) and the following analysis. For q ∈ [0, q¯],
combine the bounds in Figure 6 for Mr2 and Mr3 to obtain:
b R¯F (VF (q) · r3)− c R¯F (VF (q) · r2) ≤ (b− c) R¯F (VF (q)).
Add the bound for Mr1 :
a R¯F (VF (q) · r1) + b R¯F (VF (q) · r3)− c R¯F (VF (q) · r2) ≤ (a+ b− c) R¯F (VF (q)).
Similarly, for q ∈ [q¯, 1] combine bounds in Figure 6 for Mr2 with those for Mr1 or Mr3 (depending
on q) to obtain:
a R¯F (VF (q) · r1) + b R¯F (VF (q) · r3)− c R¯F (VF (q) · r2) ≤ (a+ b− c).
Thus, we see the revenue of the pseudo mechanism is,
M˜(F ) = 2
∫ 1
0
[
a R¯F (VF (q) · r1) + b R¯F (VF (q) · r3)− c R¯F (VF (q) · r2)
]
dq
≤ 2 (a+ b− c)
[∫ q¯
0
R¯F (VF (q)) dq + (1− q¯)
]
= OPTF (F ).
The proof then follows from the inequalities of Figure 6 which we now derive. The distribution
F is regular and by definition its revenue curve RF (q) is concave in q (Figure 7). Therefore, RF (q)
is increasing in q for any quantile smaller than the monopoly quantile q¯, i.e., q ≤ q¯, and RF (q) is
decreasing in q for any quantile larger than the monopoly quantile q¯, i.e., q ≥ q¯. Since the quantile
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01
1q¯
Figure 7: For regular distributions, RF (q) is increasing in q for any quantile q ≤ q¯, and RF (q) is
decreasing in q for any quantile q ≥ q¯.
is decreasing in values, we have that R¯F (v) is decreasing in v for any value VF (q¯), i.e., v ≥ VF (q¯),
and R¯F (v) is increasing in v for any value VF (q¯), i.e., v ≤ VF (q¯). The [0, q¯] column of Figure 6
follows from this monotonicity of R¯F (·). The Mr2 row also follows from this monotonicity with
the observation that q¯′ is defined so VF (q¯
′) · r2 equals the monopoly price VF (q¯). Thus, for q < q¯′,
higher prices such as VF (q) · r3 give lower revenue than VF (q) · r2; and for q ≥ q¯′ lower prices such
as VF (q) · r1 give lower revenue than VF (q) · r2 (thus, the negated revenues are upper bounds).
The remaining entries of 1 in Figure 6 follow from normalization which gives R¯F (v) ≤ 1 for all
prices v.
5 Prior-free versus Prior-independent Expert Learning
A main result of the paper, given in Section 2, is that optimal benchmark design, as we have defined
it, is equivalent to prior-independent optimization. Moreover, the optimal prior-free algorithm for
the optimal benchmark is the optimal prior-independent algorithm. A consequence of these results
is that there is no added robustness from the prior-free framework over the prior-independent
framework. In this section we observe, by an example of expert learning, that this potential lack
of robustness is serious and the optimal prior-independent algorithm can perform much worse
than the standard algorithms that are known to approximate the standard prior-free benchmark.
These observations are straightforward from the perspective of the expert learning literature; we
discuss them in detail so as to map them onto the framework of Section 2 and give formal proofs
for completeness. (Moreover, Appendix D parallels Section 4 shows that the relaxed benchmark
design program is not without loss of generality for expert learning.)
We consider the binary-reward variant of the canonical online expert learning problem. A
single player plays a repeated game against Nature for n rounds. In each round t, each expert j
from a discrete set {1, . . . , k} will receive a binary reward vt,j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the input space is
V = [{0, 1}k ]n. Before rewards are realized, the player chooses to “follow” a (possibly randomized)
expert for the round, and receives a reward (possibly in expectation) equal to the reward of the
followed expert. When the round concludes, the player gets to observe the rewards of all experts,
including those not followed by the player. The player’s algorithm isM which outputs distributions
Mt(v) over experts using only the history (v1, . . . , vt−1) in each round t. The class of all such online
algorithms is denoted by MOL and the performance of an online algorithm M ∈ MOL on input v
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is:
M(v) =
∑n
t=1
Ej∼Mt(v)[vt,j ] .
As described in Section 2 we can define Bayesian, prior-independent, and prior-free versions of
the expert learning problem. We summarize as follows:
• In the Bayesian model, the optimal algorithm is OPTF = argmaxM∈MOL M(F ).
Consider the following family of binary independent stationary distributions FBIS for the
Bayesian variant of the expert learning problem. For a distribution F ∈ FBIS, each expert j’s
reward in each round is a Bernoulli random variable with mean fj. The class FBIS is composed
of all possible means fj ∈ [0, 1]. At each round t, the rewards are drawn independently from
each other and from other rounds. Importantly the distribution of each expert’s reward
is identical across rounds. For binary independent stationary distributions F ∈ FBIS, the
optimal algorithm picks the expert with the highest ex ante probability j∗ = argmaxj fj and
follows expert j∗ in each round; its expected performance is
OPTF (F ) = n maxj fj.
• In the prior-free model, the optimal algorithm is the one that minimizes regret in worst-case
over inputs v ∈ V against a given benchmark B defined as
ρB = min
M∈MOL
max
v∈V
[B(v)−M(v)].
The best-in-hindsight benchmark for any reward profile v ∈ V is
BBIH(v) = maxkj=1
∑n
t=1
vt,j .
A typical online analysis measures performance in terms of worst-case regret with respect to
the best-in-hindsight benchmark BBIH.
• In the prior-independent model, the optimal algorithm is the one that minimizes regret in
worst-case over distributions F ∈ F against the optimal algorithm for the distribution
β = min
M∈MOL
max
F∈F
[OPTF (F )−M(F )].
We will be considering this question for binary independent stationary distributions FBIS
where OPTF (F ) is as described above.
We observe next that the best-in-hindsight benchmark is normalized. (In fact, it is analogous to
the normalized benchmark described by Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) for evaluating prior-free
mechanisms.) Thus, an algorithm that is a prior-free approximation of the benchmark is also a
prior-independent approximation algorithm (with the same bound on regret, cf. Proposition 1).
Lemma 14. For inputs from binary independent stationary distributions FBIS, the best-in-hindsight
benchmark BBIH is normalized, i.e., BBIH(F ) ≥ OPTF (F ), ∀F ∈ FBIS.
Proof. Given F ∈ FBIS, the Bayesian optimal algorithm OPTF selects the same expert in each
round. The best-in-hindsight benchmark selects the single expert that is best for the realized input
v. Thus, for all v ∈ V, BBIH(v) ≥ OPTF (v). Taking expectations we have the lemma.
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We now show that the natural follow-the-leader algorithm, which in round t chooses a uniform
random expert from the set of experts with highest total reward from the first t− 1 rounds, is the
prior-independent optimal algorithm.
Definition 13. The follow-the-leader algorithm selects an expert uniformly at random from the
set of experts with highest total reward from previous rounds:
MFTLt (v) = U [argmaxj
∑
t′<t
vt′,j ].
Theorem 9. For binary independent stationary distributions, the follow-the-leader algorithm is the
prior-independent optimal online learning algorithm.
Proof. Consider the Bayesian optimal online algorithm for the uniform permutation prior defined
by probabilities {f j}nj=1 that are assigned to experts via a uniform random permutation σ (i.e., the
reward of expert j is Bernoulli with mean fj = f
σ(j)). The theorem follows from the optimality of
follow-the-leader for any uniform permutation prior.
We first argue that the follow-the-leader algorithm is optimal for the any uniform permutation
prior. The optimal algorithm for the uniform permutation prior forms a posterior from the reward
history at any time t and chooses the expert with the highest expectation under this posterior.
Naturally, the experts with the highest expected reward under the posterior are the ones with the
highest historical reward (formally, Lemma 17 in Appendix C). In other words, follow-the-leader is
the Bayesian optimal algorithm for the uniform permutation prior.
As before denote by β the prior-independent optimal regret. To complete the proof, consider
the probabilities {f j}nj=1 for which the Bayesian optimal algorithm for the uniform permutation
prior obtains the largest regret. Observe that the regret of the Bayesian optimal algorithm for
this uniform permutation prior lower bounds β. On the other hand, the prior-independent regret
of the follow-the-leader algorithm upper bounds β. The follow-the-leader algorithm obtains the
same regret on all permutations and this regret equals the Bayesian optimal regret for the uniform
permutation prior; i.e., the upper bound and the lower bound are equal.
As we have proved in Section 2, benchmark optimization (γ) and prior-independent optimiza-
tion (β) are the same. Thus, the optimal prior-free benchmark is the performance of the follow-the-
leader algorithm scaled up by its prior-independent approximation factor. Moreover, the optimal
mechanism for the optimal benchmark is the follow-the-leader algorithm itself. While we may have
hoped for the prior-free analysis to lead to more robust algorithms than the prior-independent
analysis, by optimizing benchmarks in the framework provided in Section 2, we have lost all of this
potential robustness. Specifically, the standard expert learning algorithms that have low worst-case
regret against the best-in-hindsight benchmark exhibit robustness that the follow-the-leader lacks.
This observation is formalized in the following lemma which contrasts with the optimal regret of
standard algorithms like randomized weighted-majority (Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994). The op-
timal worst-case regret against best-in-hindsight is Θ(
√
n ln k) for k experts, n rounds, and binary
rewards (Haussler et al., 1995).
Lemma 15. The prior-free regret of follow-the-leader against the best-in-hindsight benchmark with
n rounds is Θ(n).
Proof. Consider the input with an even number of rounds and rounds alternating as:
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• odd round payoffs: (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1}k ,
• even round payoffs: (0, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ {0, 1}k .
The follow-the-leader algorithm chooses a uniform random expert for odd rounds and obtains
expected payoff 1k and chooses expert 1 for even rounds and obtains expected payoff of 0. The total
expected payoff of follow the leader is MFTL(v) = n2k . On the other hand, the best-in-hindsight
benchmark is BBIH(v) = n2 . The additive regret is B
BIH(v)−MFTL(v) = n2 (1− 1k ) ∈ Θ(n).
The observations of this section suggest that further study of the formulation of the benchmark
optimization problem is necessary to better understand the trade-offs between prior-free and prior-
independent robustness.
6 Historical Context: Online Algorithms and Mechanism Design
This section describes the historical development of online algorithms and mechanism design and
compares approaches across these fields.
Online algorithms have been analyzed via a worst-case competitive analysis since Sleator and Tarjan
(1985) with textbooks on the subject, e.g., Borodin and El-Yaniv (2005). In competitive analysis,
the performance of an online algorithm is measured as its worst case ratio to the optimal offline
algorithm. Good online algorithms are known with respect to this measure for many problems.
For some problems this measure is too pessimistic, occurring when no good ratio is achievable by
any algorithm and therefore good algorithms are not meaningfully separated from bad algorithms.
The two approaches for resolving this issue are to either (a) restrict the offline algorithm to which
the performance of the online algorithm is compared or (b) restrict the family of inputs that are
considered. For this paper, the most relevant example of (a) comes from online learning where
a learning algorithm’s regret is measured with respect to the best fixed action in hindsight, i.e.,
to the optimal offline algorithm that is restricted to choose the same action in each time period
(Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Freund and Schapire, 1997). The most relevant example of (b) for
this paper is the diffuse adversary model of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (2000) which evaluates
an algorithm as the ratio between its expected performance and the optimal offline performance in
worst-case over a family of distributions on inputs.
Less immediately related to our work is a systematic study of analysis frameworks for online
algorithms conducted by Boyar et al. (2015). They focus on a canonical two server problem and
show how specific analysis frameworks result in different rankings of standard algorithms for the
problem. These frameworks tend to vary the inputs compared between the algorithm and the
benchmark rather than varying the benchmark itself (as we do). For example, the competitive
ratio is the worst case over inputs of the optimal offline performance to the online algorithm’s
performance; while the max-max ratio compares the worst optimal offline performance to the worst
algorithm performance, with both worst-cases taken over normalized inputs. They also consider
analyses that directly compare algorithms rather than comparing the algorithms indirectly via a
benchmark.
To place in context the development of robust analyses of mechanisms it is helpful to consider
the predominant method for the analysis of mechanisms in economics. In economics, the preferences
of the agents are assumed to be drawn from a known distribution and the design framework asks
for the mechanism that maximizes performance (and satisfies incentive constraints) in expectation
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over this prior distribution over preferences. This area is known as Bayesian mechanism design,
e.g., see the survey by Hartline (2013).
Competitive analysis was introduced to the design of mechanisms by Goldberg et al. (2006).
While in online algorithms, the information theoretic barrier to good performance is the lack
of information that comes from the online arrival of the input, for dominant strategy incentive
compatible mechanism design, the information theoretic barrier to good performance comes from
the need to satisfy the incentive constraints of the agents, namely that truthtelling is an equilibrium.
The equivalent of the optimal offline algorithm, namely the optimal performance without incentives,
is rarely an interesting benchmark as no good ratio is achievable. Both approaches (a) and (b)
described above for online algorithms have been taken. For an example of (a), and with parallels
to online learning, Goldberg et al. (2006) compares mechanisms for selling a digital good to the
optimal revenue from posting a single price to all agents (i.e., the price-posting-revenue benchmark
discussed in the introduction). They and the subsequent literature developed the area of prior-free
mechanism design. In this area, the performance of a mechanism is compared to a benchmark
performance in worst-case over inputs.
Lower bounds are important in the study of good mechanisms. Goldberg et al. (2006) intro-
duced the following approach for establishing a lower bound on the prior-free approximation of any
mechanism to a given benchmark. The approach considers a distribution over inputs for which
all (undominated) mechanisms perform the same. For the objective of revenue maximization this
distribution is known as the equal revenue distribution and has cumulative distribution function
F (z) = 1 − 1/z on support [1,∞). An agent with value drawn from this distribution offered any
price p ≥ 1 accepts with probability 1/p and yields expected revenue 1. Goldberg et al. (2006)
show a lower bound on the prior-free approximation to a posted-price-revenue based benchmark of
2.42 in the limit with the number of agents going to infinity. For the special case of n = 3 agents,
the lower bound is 3.25; Hartline and McGrew (2005) proved that this lower bound in the n = 3
case is indeed tight by giving a mechanism that achieved it. Chen et al. (2014) proved that the
lower bound of 2.42 is tight with a non-constructive proof and, moreover, that the lower-bounding
method gives a tight bound for a large family of benchmarks that, like the one of Goldberg et al.
(2006), are constant in the value of the highest agent.
Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) revisited the choice of benchmark of Goldberg et al. (2006)
and identified the normalization constraint as presented in Section 1. Recall, they observe that if a
benchmark satisfies the normalization constraint then mechanisms that approximate the benchmark
in worst case also approximate the Bayesian optimal mechanism for any distribution in the family
(with no worse an approximation factor). This consequence is known as the prior-independent
corollary of approximation of a normalized benchmark. A specific normalized benchmark that they
give is defined by the supremum of the performance of the Bayesian optimal mechanisms for each
distribution in the family. For expert learning, this benchmark is in fact the best-in-hindsight
benchmark (see Section 5). For auction settings, Devanur et al. (2015) give a simpler normalized
benchmark based on relaxing the incentive constraints to constraints of envy-freedom.
Here we outline the origins of prior-independent analysis and compare it to the diffuse adver-
sary approach in online algorithms. The prior-independent corollary of prior-free approximation of
the benchmarks of Hartline and Roughgarden (2008) motivated the consideration of relaxing the
assumption of worst-case inputs in a similar fashion to approach (b) above. A key difference, how-
ever, between the diffuse adversary model for online algorithms (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou,
2000) and the prior-independent model is that the diffuse adversary model compares algorithms
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against the optimal offline benchmark (which relaxes the information theoretic constraints of the
online optimization problem) where as, in prior-independent mechanism design, mechanisms are
compared to the optimal mechanism for the distribution (that satisfies the incentive constraints).
The advantage of considering distributions in the diffuse adversary model is more in the spirit of
smoothed analysis. Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) considered prior-independent mechanism design
as a first-order goal and since then it has been the subject of a flourishing area of research.
The prior-independent mechanism design framework gives a natural question of identifying the
optimal mechanism. This question is framed by a restriction to a family of distributions, but is not
subject to an ad hoc performance benchmark as is prior-free mechanism design. Previous literature
has only identified optimal prior-independent mechanisms in environments that are special cases of
the fully general problem. Hartline and Roughgarden (2014) gave the prior-independent optimal
mechanism for revenue maximization in the sale of a single item to a single agent with value from
a bounded support where the prior-independent optimal mechanism posts a randomized price.
For revenue maximization in the sale of an item to one of two agents with values drawn from an
i.i.d. regular distribution, Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) show that the second price auction is a 2-
approximation. Fu et al. (2015) gave a randomized mechanism showing that this factor of 2 is not
tight. Upper and lower bounds on this canonical problem were improved by Allouah and Besbes
(2018) to be within [1.80, 1.95].A main result of our paper is to identify the prior-independent
optimal mechanism for this environment with a factor of about 1.91.3 For this two agent problem
with i.i.d. values from a distribution in the subset of regular distributions that further satisfy a
monotone hazard rate condition, Allouah and Besbes (2018) show that the second-price auction is
optimal. As we see now, the optimality of the second price auction results from constraints binding
that are loose when the class of distributions includes Triangles.
Upper and lower bounds on this canonical problem were improved by Allouah and Besbes (2018)
to be within [1.80, 1.95].4 A main result of ourthis paper is to identify the prior-independent optimal
mechanism for this environment with a factor of about 1.91. For this two agent problem with i.i.d.
values from a distribution in the subset of regular distributions that further satisfy a monotone
hazard rate condition, Allouah and Besbes (2018) show that the second-price auction is optimal.
In the context above, this paper formalizes the problem of identifying the normalized benchmark
that yields the tightest approximation by a mechanism. We show that this question is equivalent
to solving the prior-independent mechanism design problem. Thus, from our prior-independent
optimal mechanism, we identify the optimal normalized benchmark for 2-agent revenue maximiza-
tion with values drawn i.i.d. from regular distributions. Moreover, in contrast to the positive main
result of Chen et al. (2014), we show that relaxing the program to find the optimal benchmark to
the simpler program of finding the normalized benchmark that minimizes the lower bound from
Goldberg et al. (2006) (i.e., from the equal revenue distribution) is not tight. Specifically, the lower
bound for the benchmark that is optimal for the relaxed benchmark optimization program is not
tight.
3The Allouah and Besbes (2018) lower bound of 1.80 was proved under the same additional assumption of scale
invariance as our lower bound of 1.91.
4Their lower bound of 1.80 holds under the additional assumption of scale invariance.
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A Missing Proofs from Section 3
To identify the prior-independent optimal mechanism for triangle distributions, we evaluate the
ratio of revenues of markup mechanisms on triangle distributions to the optimal revenue. For
distribution Triq¯ the optimal revenue is 2 − q¯ (Lemma 4). The revenue for r-markup mechanism
is calculated by Lemma 6. In this appendix, we drive the formula of Lemma 6 and show that it
has bounded partial derivatives in both markup r and monopoly quantile q¯. We then describe the
details of the hybrid numerical and analytical argument of Theorem 4. Finally we give the proof
of continuity of the adversary’s best response distribution to the probability the mechanism places
on the second-price auction.
A.1 Derivation and smoothness of Lemma 6
Proof of Lemma 6. Denote the quantile corresponding to the price r VTriq¯(q) for markup r > 1 as
Qˆ(q, r) = QTriq¯ (r VTriq¯ (q)) =
{
q
r−qr+q if r VTriq¯ (q) ≤ 1/q¯,
0 otherwise.
When the quantile of the second highest agent is smaller than Qˆ(q¯, 1/r), the price r · v(2) is higher
than the support of the valuation distribution. Therefore, the revenue of posting price r · v(2) to
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the highest bidder is
Mr(Triq¯) = 2r
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯,1/r)
VTriq¯(q)Qˆ(q, r) dq
= 2r
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯,1/r)
1− q
1− q¯ ·
1
r − qr + q dq =
2r
1− q¯
[
q
r − 1 +
ln(r − qr + q)
(r − 1)2
]1
q¯
1/r−q¯/r+q¯
=
2r
(1− q¯)(r − 1)

 1− q¯
1− q¯ + q¯r −
ln
(
r
1−q¯+q¯r
)
r − 1

 ,
where the second equality holds just by the definition of the distribution.
Consider the revenue of r-markup mechanism on the triangle distribution Triq¯ as a function
of r ∈ (1,∞) and q¯ ∈ [0, 1]. The formula for this revenue is given by Lemma 6. The following
two claims show that the ratio of revenues has bounded partial derivative with respect to both
r ∈ (1,∞) and q¯ ∈ [0, 1] and, thus, numerical evaluation of the revenue at selected parameters
allows large regions of parameter space to be ruled out.
Claim 1. For any distribution F and any constants 1 ≤ r1 ≤ r2, we have Mr1(F ) ≥ r1/r2 Mr2(F ).
Claim 2. For any mechanism Mr with r ≥ 1, and any constants 0 ≤ q¯1 ≤ q¯2 < 1, we have
(1− q¯2)/(1− q¯1)Mr(Triq¯2) ≤Mr(Triq¯1) ≤ 2(q¯2 − q¯1) +Mr(Triq¯2).
Proof of Claim 1. For any realized valuation profile, if the item is sold in mechanism Mr2 , then the
item is sold in mechanism Mr1 since the price posted to the highest agent is smaller in mechanism
Mr1 . Moreover, when the item is sold in mechanism Mr1 , the payment from agent with highest
value is at least r1/r2 fraction of the payment in mechanism Mr2 . Taking expectation over the
valuation profiles, we have Mr1(F ) ≥ r1/r2 ·Mr2(F ).
Proof of Claim 2. Consider Qˆ(·, ·) as defined in the proof of Lemma 6, above. By directly comparing
the revenue from two distributions,
Mr(Triq¯1) = 2r
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯1,1/r)
VTriq¯1 (q) Qˆ(q, r) dq
≤ 2(−Qˆ(q¯1, 1/r) + Qˆ(q¯2, 1/r)) + 2r
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯2,1/r)
VTriq¯1 (q) Qˆ(q, r) dq
≤ 2(q¯2 − q¯1) + 2r
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯2,1/r)
VTriq¯2 (q) Qˆ(q, r) dq
= 2(q¯2 − q¯1) +Mr(Triq¯2).
The first equality holds because the quantile of VTriq¯1 (q) · r is 0 for q < Qˆ(q¯1, 1/r). The first
inequality holds because r · VTriq¯1 (q)Qˆ(q, r) ≤ 1 for any quantile q. The second inequality holds
because VTriq¯1 (q) ≤ VTriq¯2 (q) for q¯1 ≤ q¯2 and q ≥ q¯2 by the definition of distributions Triq¯1 and
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Triq¯2 , and Qˆ(q¯2, 1/r)− Qˆ(q¯1, 1/r) ≤ q¯2 − q¯1. Moreover, we have
Mr(Triq¯1) = 2r
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯1,1/r)
VTriq¯1 (q)Qˆ(q, r) dq
≥ 2r
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯2,1/r)
VTriq¯1 (q)Qˆ(q, r) dq
≥ 2r(1− q¯2)
1− q¯1
∫ 1
Qˆ(q¯2,1/r)
VTriq¯2 (q)Qˆ(q, r) dq
=
1− q¯2
1− q¯1 ·Mr(Triq¯2),
where the first inequality holds because q¯1 ≤ q¯2 and function Qˆ(q, r) is increasing in q. The second
inequality holds because VTriq¯1 (q) ≥ (1 − q¯2)/(1− q¯1) · VTriq¯2 (q).
A.2 Numerical and Analytical Arguments of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 is based on a hybrid numerical and analytical argument. We can nu-
merically calculate the revenue of a mechanism Mr on a distribution Triq¯ via Lemma 6 and then
we can argue, via Claim 2 and Claim 1, that nearby mechanisms and distributions have similar
revenue. This approach will both allow us to argue about the structure of the solution and to
identify the mechanism Mα∗,r∗ and distribution of the solution Triq¯∗ . Our subsequent discussion
gives the details of these hybrid arguments.
We first approximate q¯∗ by showing that q¯∗ ∈ [0.09310569, 0.09310571]. The parameters for this
range are found by discretizing the space and finding the optimal choice of q¯∗. Note that the optimal
choice of q¯∗ satisfiesM1(Triq¯∗) =Mr(q¯∗)(Triq¯∗). Therefore, it is sufficient for us to show that for any
quantile q¯ 6∈ [0.09310569, 0.09310571], either M1(Triq¯) > Mr(q¯)(Triq¯) or M1(Triq¯) < Mr(q¯)(Triq¯).
First we show for any q¯ ∈ [0, 0.09310569], M1(Triq¯) < Mr(q¯)(Triq¯). Here we discretize the space
[0, 0.09310569] into Qd with precision ǫ = 10
−9. By numerically calculation using Lemma 6, we
have
min
q¯∈Qd
M2.446946(Triq¯) =M2.446946(Tri0.09310569) ≥ 1 + 10−8
and for any q¯ ∈ [0, 0.09310569], letting q¯d be the largest quantile in Qd smaller than or equal to q¯,
the minimum revenue for mechanism M2.446946 is
M2.446946(Triq¯) ≥ 1− q¯d − ǫ
1− q¯d
·M2.446946(Triq¯d) ≥ 1 + 8× 10−9 > M1(Triq¯),
where the first inequality holds by Claim 2 and the second inequality holds because q¯d ≤ 0.1.
Then we show for any q¯ ∈ [0.09310571, 1], M1(Triq¯) > Mr(q¯)(Triq¯). We discretize the space
[0.09310571, 1] into Qˆd with precision ǫˆ = 10
−9. First note that Mr(Triq¯) < 1 for any q¯ ≥ 0.093
and r ≥ 11, since the expected probability the highest type got allocated is less than 12 , and hence
the expected virtual value for mechanism Mr with distribution Triq¯ is less than 1. By Lemma 4,
the revenue in this case is less than 1. With bounded range for optimal ratio r, we discretize the
space (1, 11] into Rd with precision ǫr = 10
−9. By numerically calculation using Lemma 6, we have
max
q¯∈Qˆd,r∈Rd
Mr(Triq¯) =M2.446945061(Tri0.09310571) ≤ 1− 3× 10−8
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and for any q¯ ∈ [0.09310571, 1] and any r ∈ (1, 11], letting q¯d be the largest quantile in Qˆd smaller
than or equal to q¯ and rd be the smallest number in Rd larger than or equal to r, the maximum
revenue for distribution Triq¯ is
max
r∈(1,11]
Mr(Triq¯) ≤ rd
rd − ǫr · (2ǫˆ+Mrd(Triq¯d)) ≤ 1− 10
−8 < M1(Triq¯),
where the first inequality holds by Claim 1 and 2, and the second inequality holds because rd > 1.
Combining the numerical calculation, we have that q¯∗ ≈ 0.0931057.
Note that both mechanism M1 and Mr∗ are the best responses for distribution Triq¯∗ , achieving
revenue 1, and hence the optimal prior independent approximation ratio is
β =
OPTTriq¯∗ (Triq¯∗)
Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯∗)
= 2− q¯∗ ≈ 1.9068943.
Next we show that by choosing ratio r∗ ≈ 2.4469452 and probability α∗ ≈ 0.80564048, the
prior independent approximation ratio of mechanism Mα∗,r∗ approximates β. Here we discretize
the quantile space [0, 1] into Q′d with precision ǫ
′ = 10−9, using the formula in Lemma 4 and
Lemma 6, the triangle distribution that maximizes the approximation ratio for mechanism Mα∗,r∗
is Tri0.093105694 with approximation ratio at most 1.9068943044. For any q¯ ∈ [0, 12 ], letting q¯d be
the largest quantile in Q′d smaller than or equal to q¯, the minimum revenue for mechanism Mα∗,r∗
is
Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯) ≥ 1− q¯d − ǫ
′
1− q¯d
·Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯d) ≥
1
1.906894309
OPTq¯d(Triq¯d) ≥
1
1.906894309
OPTq¯(Triq¯),
where the second inequality holds because q¯d ≤ 12 and the last inequality holds because q¯d ≤ q¯. For
any q¯ ∈ [12 , 1], the minimum revenue for mechanism Mα∗,r∗ is
Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯) ≥ α∗ ·M1(Triq¯) ≥ 0.8 ≥ 1
1.875
OPTq¯(Triq¯),
since for any q¯ ∈ [12 , 1], M1(Triq¯d) = 1 and OPTq¯(Triq¯) = 2 − q¯ ≤ 1.5. Therefore, r∗ ≈ 2.4469452
and probability α∗ ≈ 0.80564048 are the desirable parameters, with error at most 2× 10−8 in prior
independent approximation ratio. By our characterization, the error solely comes from numerical
calculation, finishing the numerical analysis for Theorem 4.
A.3 Continuity of Distribution in Probability of Second-price Auction
Recall the function q¯r(α) which gives the adversary’s best-response triangle distribution the mech-
anism Mα,r. The continuity of the function q¯r(α) is used to prove the existence of equilibrium
between the randomized markup mechanism and the triangle distribution in Theorem 4. The
following claim proves the continuity of the function q¯r(α), by numerically bounding the second
derivative of the revenue ratio of the stochastic markup mechanism Mα,r on distribution Triq¯ with
respect to α, the probability that the markup mechanism runs the second-price auction.
Claim 3. Given any r ∈ [2.445, 2.449], function q¯r(α) is continuous in α for α ∈ [0.8, 0.81].
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Proof of Claim 3. By Lemma 6 and Theorem 2, the approximation ratio of mechanism Mα,r for
triangle distribution Triq¯ is
APX(α, r, q¯) =
OPTTriq¯(Triq¯)
α ·M1(Triq¯) + (1− α)Mr(Triq¯)
=
2− q¯
α+ 2r(1−α)(1−q¯)(r−1)
(
1−q¯
1−q¯+q¯r +
ln
(
r
1−q¯+q¯r
)
1−r
)
The approximation ratio is a continuous function of α, q¯. Therefore, to show that fixing r, function
q¯r(α) is continuous in α, it is sufficient to show that there is a unique q¯ that maximizes APX(α, r, q¯)
for r ∈ [2.445, 2.449] and α ∈ [0.8, 0.81], or equivalently, we show that there is a unique q¯ that
minimizes 1/APX(α, r, q¯). By Claim 1 and 2, we can discretize the quantile space and numerically
verify that distributions with monopoly quantiles q¯ 6∈ [0.093, 0.094] are suboptimal. Therefore, we
prove the uniqueness of the maximizer by showing that the second order derivative of 1/APX(α, r, q¯)
is strictly positive for q¯ ∈ [0.093, 0.094].
∂2 1APX(α,r,q¯)
(∂q¯)2
=
4(1− α)r
(
− r−1
(1−q¯+q¯r)2
+ 1(1−q¯)(1−q¯+q¯r) −
log( r
1−q¯+q¯r
)
(r−1)(1−q¯)2
)
(r − 1)(2 − q¯)2
+
2(1− α)r
(
− (r−1)2
(1−q¯+q¯r)3
− r−1
(1−q¯)(1−q¯+q¯r)2
+ 2
(1−q¯)2(1−q¯+q¯r)
+
2 log( r
1−q¯+q¯r
)
(r−1)(1−q¯)3
)
(r − 1)(2 − q¯)
+
4(1− α)r
(
− 11−q¯+q¯r −
log( r
1−q¯+q¯r
)
(r−1)(1−q¯)
)
+ 2α(r − 1)
(r − 1)(2 − q¯)3
By substituting the upper and lower bounds of α, r, q¯, we know that
∂2 1APX(α,r,q¯)
(∂q¯)2
> 0.7
for r ∈ [2.445, 2.449], α ∈ [0.8, 0.81] and q¯ ∈ [0.093, 0.094], which concludes the uniqueness of the
maximizer and the continuity of function q¯r(α).
B Missing Proof from Section 4
We first establish the proofs of Lemma 12 and Lemma 13. We then give the proof of Theorem 8
and auxiliary lemmas that establish a gap between the relaxed benchmark design program and the
benchmark design program for regular distributions.
Proof of Lemma 12 and Lemma 13. The proof for these two lemmas is similar to the numerical
calculation in Theorem 4. For Lemma 12, we discretize the quantile space [0.05, 0.25] into Qd with
precision ǫ = 10−5, and compute the minimum approximation ratio of mechanism M1.1 for any q¯
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in the discretized points in Qd using Lemma 6 (Section 3). By numerical calculation, the minimum
approximation ratio is
min
q¯∈Qd
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
M1.1(Triq¯)
=
OPTTri0.05(Tri0.05)
M1.1(Tri0.05)
≥ 2.0026
and the minimum revenue for mechanism M1.1 is
min
q∈Qd
M1.1(Triq¯) =M1.1(Tri0.25) ≥ 0.74.
For any q¯ ∈ [0.05, 0.25], let q¯d be the largest quantile in Qd smaller than or equal to q¯, we have
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
M1.1(Triq¯)
≥ OPTTriq¯d+ǫ(Triq¯d+ǫ)
2ǫ+M1.1(Triq¯d)
=
2− q¯d − ǫ
2− q¯d ·
OPTTriq¯d (Triq¯d)
2ǫ+M1.1(Triq¯d)
≥ 2− q¯d − ǫ
(2− q¯d)(1 + 3ǫ) ·
OPTTriq¯d (Triq¯d)
M1.1(Triq¯d)
≥ 2,
where the first inequality holds by applying Lemma 4 (Section 3) and Claim 2 (Appendix A), and the
equality holds by applying Lemma 4. The second inequality holds by noticing that 3M1.1(Triq¯d) ≥
3× 0.74 ≥ 2.
We apply the similar analysis to the proof of Lemma 13. We discretize the quantile space
[0, 0.05] ∪ [0.25, 1] into Qˆd with precision ǫˆ = 10−5, and compute the minimum approximation
ratio of mechanism Mα∗,r∗ for any q¯ in the discretized points in Qˆd using Lemma 6. By numerical
calculation, the minimum approximation ratio in Qˆd is
min
q¯∈Qˆd
OPTTriq¯(Triq¯)
Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯)
=
OPTTri0.05(Tri0.05)
Mα∗,r∗(Tri0.05)
≤ 1.90406
and for any q¯ ∈ [0, 0.05] ∪ [0.25, 0.5], we have
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯)
≤ 1− q¯d
1− q¯d − ǫ ·
OPTTriq¯d (Triq¯d)
Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯d)
≤ 1.9041,
where the first inequality holds by applying Lemma 4 and Claim 2 and the last inequality holds
because q¯ ≤ 0.5. For any q¯ ∈ [0.5, 1], we have
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯)
Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯)
≤ OPTTri0.5(Tri0.5)
α∗ ·M1(Triq¯) ≤ 1.88,
and combining the inequalities gives the desired result.
The main difference for proving the gap for distributions comparing to triangle distributions
is that the space for regular distributions is larger and we need to define more carefully what it
means to have a distribution close to the worst case triangle distribution Triq¯. By Theorem 3,
let Mα∗,r∗ be the approximately optimal prior-independent mechanism with numerical parameters
α∗ = 0.80564048, r∗ = 2.4469452. We first define a pseudo-mechanism M˜ as the affine combination
of mechanisms with revenue M˜(v) = (1+δ)Mα∗ ,r∗(v)−δ ·M1.18(v), where δ > 0 is a small constant.
Recall that FReg is the family of regular distributions. We show that
35
01
δ1
δ2
1q1 q2q3
Figure 8: The revenue curve for distribution F¯ .
1. ∀F ∈ FReg, M˜(F ) ≤ OPTF (F );
2. ∀F ∈ FReg, β′ M˜ (F ) ≥ OPTF (F ), where β′ < β.
Letting B(v) = β′ · M˜(v), benchmark B is normalized for all regular distributions and the approx-
imation of optimal payoff against benchmark B is β′ < β = γ. Therefore, the approximation of the
optimal heuristic benchmark is γ¯ ≤ β′ < γ and Theorem 8 holds.
The first statement holds by Lemma 11. To show the second statement holds, since we know the
worst case distribution Triq∗ for the optimal prior-independent mechanism Mα∗,r∗ , intuitively, it is
sufficient to show that mechanism M1.18 has lower revenue for any distribution close to distribution
Triq∗ . Formally, for any 0 < q1 < q2 < 1, 0 < δ1, δ2 < 1, let F¯ be the distribution such that
RF¯ (q) =


q(1−δ1)
q1
+ δ1 0 ≤ q ≤ q1,
1 q1 < q < q2,
q(δ2−1)
1−q2
+ δ2 +
1−δ2
1−q2
q2 ≤ q ≤ 1.
The revenue curve for distribution F¯ is shown in Figure 8. Note that if distribution F is close to
distribution Triq∗ , then naturally we have F stochastically dominated by distribution F¯ . Before
proving Theorem 8, we first propose a formula for upper bounding the revenue of Mr for any
distribution F stochastically dominated by F¯ , which will be used later to upper bound the revenue of
mechanismM1.18 for any distribution close to Triq¯∗ . According to Figure 8, letting q3 = q2/(1− q1 + q2)
and q4 = QF¯ (1/q2) =
rq2(1−q2δ2)
1−q2+rq2(1−δ2)
, we upper bound the revenue of mechanism Mr for distribution
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F by
1
2
·Mr(F ) =
∫ 1
0
R¯F (VF (q) · r) dq
=
∫ q3
0
R¯F (VF (q) · r) dq +
∫ Qˆ(q1,1/r)
q3
R¯F (VF (q) · r) dq
+
∫ q4
Qˆ(q1,1/r)
R¯F (VF (q) · r) dq +
∫ 1
q4
R¯F (VF (q) · r) dq
≤ rq1q3δ1
q1r − (1− δ1)q2 +
∫ Qˆ(q1,1/r)
q3
R¯F
(
r(1− q)
1− q1
)
dq + q4 − rq1
r − q1 + rq1 +
∫ 1
q4
R¯F (VF (q) · r) dq
≤ rq1q3δ1
q1r − (1− δ1)q2 +
∫ Qˆ(q1,1/r)
q3
rq1δ1(1− q)
rq1(1− q)− q(1− δ1)(1− q1) dq
+ q4 − rq1
r − q1 + rq1 +
∫ 1
q4
1
1− q2
(
1− q2δ2 − (1− q2δ2)(1 − δ2)−r(1− δ2) + r(1− q2δ2)/q + (1− δ2)
)
dq. (5)
The first inequality holds because for any q ≤ q3, the price VF (q) · r is higher than 1/q1 and the
revenue curve has positive slope. Therefore, the revenue is higher if the price is lower, which is at
least 1/q2. Moreover, R¯F (VF (q) · r) ≤ 1 for any quantile q. The second inequality holds similarly
since the slope on revenue curve is negative for q ≥ q4. With this upper bound on the revenue, we
can continue to the numerical calculation for the gap between two programs.
Proof of Theorem 8. We prove the gap by upper bounding the revenue of mechanism M1.18 and
lower bounding the revenue of mechanism Mα∗,r∗ for regular distributions parameterized by their
monopoly quantile q¯.
First we upper bounding the revenue of mechanism M1.18. By substituting r = 1.18, q1 =
0.09, q2 = 0.098, δ1 = δ2 = 0.01 as parameter for distribution F¯ , we have M1.18(F ) ≤ 0.98444 for
any distribution F stochastically dominated by F¯ by Inequality (5), and M1.18(F ) ≤ OPTF (F )
otherwise.
Next we bound the revenue of mechanismMα∗,r∗ for different sets of regular distributions. If the
distribution F is stochastically dominated by F¯ , by numerical result in Appendix A, the revenue of
mechanismMα∗,r∗ is at least 1/1.90689431·OPTF (F ). If distribution F is not stochastically dominated
by F¯ , we can divide the analysis for mechanism Mα∗,r∗ into two cases.
1. When q¯ 6∈ [0.0905, 0.096]. In this case, the approximation ratio of mechanism Mα∗,r∗ for
distribution F is at most the approximation ratio for triangle distribution Triq¯, which is
at least 1.9068845 by discretizing the quantile space and applying numerical computation
using Lemma 6 and Claim 2, i.e., the revenue of mechanism Mα∗,r∗ in this case is at least
0.5244156 ·OPTF (F ).
2. When q¯ ∈ [0.0905, 0.096], since the distribution F is not stochastically dominated by F¯ ,
distribution F is not a triangle distribution. Here we consider two subcases.
(a) There exists q > 0.096 such that RF (q) > RF¯ . In this case, the distribution F max-
imizes the approximation ratio is the truncated distribution and the optimal revenue
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for distribution F is 2 − q¯. Since distribution F is not a triangle distribution, and by
Claim 3, the increase of revenue for mechanism Mα∗,r∗ is at least 0.0005, and thus
Mα∗,r∗(F ) ≥ 1
1.90689431
·OPTF (F ) + 0.0005 ≥ 0.5246OPTF (F )
where the last inequality holds because OPTF (F ) ≤ 2.
(b) There exists q < 0.0905 such that RF (q) > RF¯ . In this case, the revenue of the op-
timal mechanism for distribution F increases by at least 0.0009 comparing to triangle
distribution Triq¯, and the second price auction increases by at least this much. Therefore,
Mα∗,r∗(F )
OPTF (F )
≥ Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯) + 0.0009α
∗
OPTTriq¯ (Triq¯) + 0.0009
≥ 0.5245
where the last inequality holds because Mα∗,r∗(Triq¯) ≥ 0.5244156 · OPTF (Triq¯), and
OPTTriq¯(Triq¯) ≥ 2− q¯ ≥ 1.905 for q¯ ≤ 0.095.
Combining the two subcases, we have that the revenue of mechanism Mα∗,r∗ is at least
0.5245 ·OPTF (F ) for F not dominated by F¯ and q¯ ∈ [0.091, 0.095].
By setting δ = 5.21× 10−6, for both cases, we have β′ ≤ 1.90689356 ≤ β − 7× 10−7, where the
last inequality holds because as we illustrated in the numerical result in Appendix A, the optimal
prior independent approximation ratio is β = 2 − q¯∗ ≥ 2 − 0.09310571 = 1.90689429. By setting
the benchmark B(v) = 1.90689422[(1 + δ)Mα∗ ,r∗(v) − δ ·M1.18(v)], benchmark B is normalized
and the approximation ratio of the optimal revenue against benchmark B is at most 1.90689422.
Therefore, the approximation of optimal revenue against the optimal heuristic benchmark is at
most the approximation against benchmark B, which implies γ¯ ≤ β′ < β = γ.
C Missing Proof from Section 5
Recall from the proof of Theorem 9 that permutation distributions are defined by probabilities
{f j}nj=1 assigned to experts via a uniform random permutation σ (the reward of expert j is Bernoulli
with mean fj = f
σ(j)). Here we formally prove that, for permutation distributions, follow-the-leader
MFTL chooses the optimal expert according to the posterior distribution induced by the realized
reward history.
At any time t, let the cumulative reward Vt,j =
∑
t′<t vt′,j be the total number of 1’s realized
for expert j until time t− 1 and let
jct = argmaxj Vt,j
be the best expert chosen by MFTL. Let
jpt = argmaxj E[vt,j | {vt′}t′<t]
be expert that maximizes the expected reward for the posterior distribution. Hartline et al. (2015)
show that when there are two experts, the expert jpt that maximizes the expected payoff according
to the posterior is the expert jct that maximizes the cumulative reward Vt,j. That is, j
p
t = j
c
t for
any time t. In Lemma 17, we generalize the result to m experts for any m ≥ 2.
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Definition 14. Let f1 ≥ f2 ≥ · · · ≥ fm be a sequence of probabilities for binary independent
stationary distributions F . Distribution F is non-degenerate if f1 > fm and there exists k such
that fk ∈ (0, 1).
We prove the results in this section for non-degenerate distributions, and the degenerate case
is trivial.
Lemma 16 (Lemma 4.3 in Hartline et al., 2015). At any time t, when there are two experts 1, 2
with cumulative reward Vt,1 > Vt,2 and non-degenerate distribution with probability f1 > f2,
Pr[σ(1) = 1 and σ(2) = 2 | {vt′}t′<t] > Pr[σ(1) = 2 and σ(2) = 1 | {vt′}t′<t];
the probabilities are equal if Vt,1 = Vt,2 or f1 = f2.
Proof. The proof can be found in Hartline et al. (2015), and we include it here for completeness.
The lemma trivially holds if f1 = 1 or f2 = 0. Otherwise, we have f1, f2 ∈ (0, 1) and
Pr[σ(1) = 1 and σ(2) = 2 | {vt′}t′<t]
Pr[σ(1) = 2 and σ(2) = 1 | {vt′}t′<t] =
f
Vt,2
2 · (1− f2)t−Vt,2 · fVt,11 · (1− f1)t−Vt,1
f
Vt,1
2 · (1− f2)t−Vt,1 · fVt,21 · (1− f1)t−Vt,2
=
(
1 +
f1 − f2
f2(1− f1)
)Vt,1−Vt,2
which is strictly larger than 1; the inequality is an equality if Vt,1 = Vt,2 or f1 = f2.
Lemma 17. For any m ≥ 2, any non-degenerate distribution F , any pair of experts j, j′ and for
any time t, E[vt,j | {vt′}t′<t] > E
[
vt,j′ | {vt′}t′<t
]
if Vt,j > Vt,j′, and the expectations are equal if
Vt,j = Vt,j′.
Proof. Let f1 ≥ f2 ≥ · · · ≥ fm be a sequence of probabilities for non-degenerate distribution F .
Suppose there is a uniform random permutation σ such that the reward distribution for expert j is
fσ(j). For any expert j
′ with Vt,j > Vt,j′ , the expected reward conditional on the reward from time
1 to t− 1 is
E[vt,j | {vt′}t′<t] =
∑
s
fsPr[σ(j) = s | {vt′}t′<t]
=
∑
s,s′
fsPr[σ(j) = s and σ(j
′) = s′ | {vt′}t′<t]
>
∑
s,s′
fsPr[σ(j
′) = s and σ(j) = s′ | {vt′}t′<t]
=
∑
s
fsPr[σ(j
′) = s | {vt′}t′<t]
= E
[
vt,j′ | {vt′}t′<t
]
,
where the inequality holds by Lemma 16; it becomes an equality if Vt,j = Vt,j′ .
From Lemma 17, we immediately have the following theorem.
Theorem 10. For the uniform permutation of any non-degenerate binary independent stationary
distribution F , the follow-the-leader algorithm MFTL is the strict optimal algorithm that maximizes
the expected reward given the posterior distribution in each round t.
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D Gap for Expert Learning
In this section, we show that the gap between program (γ¯) and (γ) exists for expert learning as well.
First we make the following observation for follow-the-leader with non-degenerate distributions.
Lemma 18. For any non-degenerate binary independent stationary distribution F , the expected
performance of follow-the-leader at any round t is less than its expected performance at round t+1,
i.e., E
[
MFTLt (v)
]
< E
[
MFTLt+1 (v)
]
.
Proof. Consider the uniform permutation environment under any non-degenerate distribution F .
Theorem 10 shows that follow-the-leader is strictly optimal in every round. Specifically, any algo-
rithm that selects an expert that does not have the highest historical reward obtains strictly smaller
expected reward in this round.
Now consider two algorithms for selecting an expert in round t+ 1:
1. follow the leader from rounds {1, . . . , t− 1}, or
2. follow the leader from rounds {1, . . . , t}.
The expected round t + 1 payoffs of these algorithms are E
[
MFTLt (v)
]
and E
[
MFTLt+1 (v)
]
, respec-
tively. Under the assumption that the distribution is non-degenerate, there is a positive probability
that the sets of experts with the highest historical rewards before round t and t + 1 are distinct;
thus, by Theorem 10 the payoff of the former is strictly less than the payoff of the latter.
Of course, the follow-the-leader algorithm obtains the same payoff regardless of the permutation
of probabilities to experts; thus, the strict inequality of the lemma holds for any non-degenerate
binary independent stationary distribution F .
Theorem 11. For binary independent stationary reward distributions in expert learning problem
with time horizon n ≥ 2, the heuristic benchmark optimization program (γ¯) has a strictly smaller
objective value than the benchmark optimization program (γ), i.e., γ¯ < γ.
Proof. For benchmark optimization program (γ), the optimal benchmark is scaled-up follow-the-
leader β ·MFTL, where β is the prior-independent approximation ratio for follow-the-leader MFTL,
and γ = β.
Now consider another benchmark B(v) = β′M˜(v), where M˜(v) = n ·MFTLn (v) and β′ is the
prior-independent approximation ratio for M˜ . It is easy to verify that for any binary independent
stationary F with probabilities f1, . . . , fk,
M˜ (F ) = n · E[MFTLn (v)] ≤ n ·maxj fj = OPTF (F ).
Therefore, benchmark B is normalized and the resolution of benchmark B with respect to program
(γ¯) is at most β′. It is sufficient to prove β′ < β to prove Theorem 11.
First we show that degenerate distributions are not worst case for prior-independent approxima-
tion for either follow-the-leader MFTL or pseudo-mechanism M˜ . Note that for any distribution such
that the expected reward for all experts are the same, we have MFTL(F ) = M˜(F ) = OPTF (F ),
and hence such a distribution is not the worst case. Moreover, for degenerate distribution F such
that the expected reward for experts are not all the same, we can regenerate a non-degenerate dis-
tribution F ′ such that the prior-independent approximation ratio for both follow-the-leader MFTL
40
and pseudo-mechanism M˜ are worse, by switching the distribution of receiving reward 1 with prob-
ability 0, to the distribution of receiving reward 1 with probability 12 . This does not affect the
expected performance of the optimal mechanism, but strictly decreases the expected performance
of follow-the-leader MFTL and pseudo-mechanism M˜ .
Now we focus on distribution F that is non-degenerate. We show that for any such distribution,
MFTL(F ) < M˜(F ), which implies β′ < β. Formally, we have that
MFTL(F ) = Ev
[∑
t≤n
MFTLt (v)
]
< Ev
[∑
t≤n
MFTLn (v)
]
= M˜(F )
where the inequality holds by Lemma 18 and n ≥ 2.
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